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Chapter 1:
Introduction
In the summer of 2011, the US was brought to the brink of economic catastrophe.
Republicans in Congress signaled that they would refuse to authorize an increase
in the debt ceiling unless President Barack Obama and the Democrats in Congress
agreed to deep cuts in federal spending. In years past, the raising of the debt ceiling
was not a particularly contentious issue. In fact, authorizing a debt ceiling increase
was generally recognized in both political parties as necessary to ensuring economic
security. As it happens, failure to do so could result in the US defaulting on its debt
and having its credit rating downgraded. The consequences of failing to increase the
debt ceiling, therefore, would have been devastating, not just for the US economy
but for the global economy as well. But, 2011 was not a typical year. In the previous
year’s midterm elections, a number of Tea Party-backed candidates were elected to
Congress.
In the days and weeks leading up to the fiscal cliff—the point at which failure
to act would result in economic consequences—Obama and Republican leadership
met multiple times to negotiate terms. However, their attempts proved unsuccessful. Speaker of the House, John Boehner along with other long-serving Members of
Congress (heretofore, Members or MCs) in the GOP leadership knew that the newly
elected Tea Party-affiliated Members—as well as others who were sympathetic to
their cause—would be reluctant to go along. But, just hours before the US was set
to default, negotiations finally succeeded. On August 2, the Budget Control Act of
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2011 was signed into law. It is worth noting, however, that despite the Democrats
and Republicans securing their “grand bargain,” 66 Republicans still voted against
the bill, most of whom were individuals affiliated with the Tea Party movement
(Steinhauer 2011).
The debt ceiling crisis was a signal to establishment Republicans that the conventional norms of party politics and governing were no longer in play. Tea Party
Members made clear that they had little interest in compromise, and that they were
willing to sacrifice party unity to achieve their ideological agenda. Tea Party Members had also come to recognize that they had emerged as a highly influential group
in the GOP House Caucus.1 As Rachel Blum (2016, 2020) points out, once Tea
Party-backed candidates got elected, the Tea Party went from an external protest
movement to an institutional insurgency committed to the goal of transforming the
Republican Party from within.
Over the next few years, the Tea Party bloc in the House became highly organized and increasingly influential in the GOP Caucus (Blum 2020; Skocpol and
Williamson 2016). And they soon began wielding their influence against their establishment Republican colleagues. Between the 112th and 114th Congresses, there
was a significant increase in establishment Republicans voting with their Tea Party
counterparts (Blum 2020, pp. 87-88).
Those who did not adequately demonstrate their commitment to conservative
1

The Republicans in Congress refer to themselves as the Republican Conference. However, for
consistency I refer to both the Democratic and Republican Party organizations in Congress as
Caucuses.
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ideological principles were labeled colloquially (and pejoratively) as RINOs (Republicans in name only). Many among them faced primary challenges from the right
over the next couple of election cycles—some survived, and some did not. One of the
most shocking primaries happened in 2014 when Eric Cantor was bested by David
Brat, a largely unknown Tea Party candidate. The defeat stunned the political world
for two reasons. First, few people—including Cantor himself—expected Brat to be
competitive, much less win. In fact, Cantor later recalled in an interview that he did
not realize he was in danger of losing until the day of the election (Roberts 2016).
Second, and more importantly, Cantor was the Republican Majority Leader, second
in the GOP Caucus only to the Speaker of the House.
Still others, frustrated with the inability to work with the Tea Party bloc,
opted out of Congress all together. Perhaps the most notable to leave political life
was Speaker John Boehner. Boehner’s agenda, as it turned out, proved not to be
far enough to the right in the Tea Party era. In fact, the House Freedom Caucus—
an invitation-only caucus founded by Tea Party Republicans—conditioned membership on a willingness to oppose Boehner on any bill that did not meet the ultraconservative ideological standards of the group (Lizza 2015). Ultimately, Boehner’s
decision to leave Congress came after Mark Meadows—one of the founding members
of the Freedom Caucus—introduced a “motion to vacate the chair”2 which would
have effectively triggered a confidence vote on the Speaker (Aull 2015).
One legacy of the Tea Party era in Congress is that it helped shift the Republican
2

A motion to vacate is a parliamentary procedure that triggers a vote on whether to remove a
sitting speaker. According to Aull (2015), it had been more than 100 years since the last time a
motion to vacate had been introduced.
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Party significantly to the right (Gaffney et al. 2014).3 In doing so, it highlighted the
importance of individual and group influence in changing the ideological direction
of a party. Had the Tea Party Members been contained and marginalized from
the outset, it is quite possible that their influence on the Republican Party would
have waned, and there would have been little long-term effect. But, that is not what
happened. Instead, Tea Party Members came to Congress with an already established
organization—the Tea Party Caucus, founded in July of 2010 by Michelle Bachmann
of Minnesota. They also had a network-in-waiting of sympathetic potential allies—
52 MCs had joined Bachmann’s Tea Party Caucus before the first Tea Party-backed
candidate had been seated (Gervais and Morris 2012). Additionally, Tea Partiers
were granted substantial media attention, especially from right-leaning networks,
and they were very effective at raising large amounts of money from both big and
small donors (Skocpol and Williamson 2016).
So, what might the case of the Tea Party teach us about the ways in which political parties change ideologically? Does shifting the ideological balance of power and
influence in a party’s congressional caucus affect party change? Can we use Memberto-Member relationships to map out a party’s influence structure? Do changes in the
influence structure create opportunities for some individuals or groups to increase
their own influence in the party? And what can the ideological distribution of the
“core” of the party—the group of the most influential Members—tell us about the
processes, or mechanisms, of party change? These are some of the questions that I
3

Many others have argued that a second legacy of the Tea Party was that it opened the door
to another significant and more recent shift in the GOP—toward Trumpism (Patenaude III 2019;
Post 2017).
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will address throughout this dissertation. However, before outlining the argument
and organization of the dissertation, it is first important to discuss how scholars have
approached the causes and mechanisms of party change in the literature.

Party Change in the Literature
One of the earliest theories of party change suggests that parties undergo rapid and
systemic transformations in response to ideological shifts in the electorate (Brady
1988; Burnham 1970; Key 1955; Schattschneider 1960a; Sundquist 2011). Realignment theory, as it is known, argues that the catalyst is usually a salient cross-cutting
issue that forces voters to reevaluate their partisan affiliations. In order to correct
for these changes in the electorate, party elites reshuffle into coalitions that reflect
the new issue cleavages. Most realignment scholars argue that realignments tend to
occur in “critical elections” that create distinct party eras (Brady 1988; Burnham
1970; Sundquist 2011).4
However, the realignment framework has come under intense fire for its conceptual limitations and its general lack of empirical support (Andersen 1979; Carmines
and Stimson 1989; Ladd 1990; Mayhew 2008). Carmines and Stimson (1989), for
instance, challenge realignment theory on two grounds. First, the authors take exception with the idea that political elites are responding to mass shifts in the electorate. Instead, they contend that any changes in public opinion on a given issue is a
reflection of positional changes within the elites. The idea that voters generally lack
4

A notable exception is Key (1959), one of the pioneering authors in the realignment literature,
who acknowledged that realignments may also be “secular,” or gradual.
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coherent opinion and instead take cues from political elites is not controversial and
enjoys robust support in the literature (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). Second, Carmines and Stimson (1989) challenge the notion that systemic
party change occurs as a result of a critical realigning election. Rather, they describe
transformation as a “punctuated equilibrium” in which a “critical moment” ushers
in a period of more gradual change (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Thus, the implication is that party change is incremental because it is occurring on an issue-by-issue
basis.
One limitation of the issue evolution framework is that because of its focus on
issue change, analysis of wholesale party change is not practical. This is born out
in the literature as studies applying the issue evolution framework tend to only look
at one or two issues at a time. For example, Carmines and Stimson (1986, 1989)
look at race, Adams (1997) at abortion, Abramowitz (1994) at welfare and national
security, Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002) at environment and gun control, and
Wolbrecht (2002) at women’s rights.
Issue evolution has also been criticized for emphasizing replacement as the dominant mechanism of party change (Karol 2009).5 In other words, parties shift positions
on issues as members of the old guard are replaced by new, ideologically divergent
individuals. Instead, Karol (2009), a prominent advocate of the group-centric theory
of parties, argues that elites change issue positions because of incentives related to
coalition management. Therefore, Member adaptation “is a greater source of [party]
5

Karol (2009) also criticizes issue evolution’s role in party change as a function of happenstance
rather than driven by group interests and behavior.

6

change than replacement” (Karol 2009, p.24).
However, a criticism of the group-centric theory of parties, which is applicable to
Karol’s theory of party change specifically, is that it is “too dismissive of the role and
agency of elected office holders and voters in placing constraints on these groups and
social activists” (McCarty and Schickler 2018, p.178). Rather, it treats individual
MCs largely as agents of policy demanding groups without sufficiently acknowledging
that elected officials have legislative and electoral motives of their own. If we accept
that elected officials have even a modicum of self-agency—a reasonable assumption
to be sure—then what can explain party change?
Lee and Brady (2020) address this question by introducing an evolutionary game
theoretic model to highlight the problems of intra-party coordination. They argue
that party changes occur through stages in which new MCs who want to change
the status quo are initially opportunistic in their demands. However, as change
initiators approach a critical mass in the party, their demands become increasingly
overt. Ultimately, the old guard face a choice: they must either adapt or leave the
party.6
There is reason to suspect that the theories of Karol and Lee and Brady are
both at play in party change. On the one hand, MCs should be concerned with
coalition management for both electoral and legislative reasons (Bawn et al. 2012;
Baylor 2017; Cohen et al. 2009; Karol 2009; Masket 2011). However, MCs are also
6

Although it is theoretically possible for an MC to switch parties or become an independent,
as Justin Amash did, party switching is incredibly rare. The more likely outcome would be for a
Member to leave politics altogether.
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rational and ambitions individuals who come to Congress with ideological beliefs
and policy preferences (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000b), and who are
motivated by reelection considerations (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974). Therefore, they
must balance their coalition management incentives with their individual incentives.
But, we must not conceptualize Member behavior, whether motivated by group or
individual considerations, as occurring in a vacuum. Rather, MCs vary considerably
in their leverage and resources, and they are inextricably tied to one another through
complex relationships.

Influence and Party Networks
To explain party change, I begin with the conception of political parties in Congress
as networks of complex relationships between Members in the party caucus. Depending on the nature of the relationships, some Members will have greater influence in
the party than others. Those with greater influence are the more central in the
party—they collectively make up the “core” of the party network. Conversely, those
with less influence occupy space on the “periphery” of the party network. Depending
on the distribution of MCs between the core and the periphery—and their respective
influence—the party network will exhibit different structural characteristics. As we
shall see in Chapter 3, sometimes parties are more centralized, and other times they
are more decentralized.
I argue that party change is a function of which MCs have the greatest influence
in the party network at any given point in time. Those with the greatest influence are
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more likely to get those in their sphere of influence to assimilate to their ideological
positions. Likewise, influence affects the ways in which old Members are replaced
with new ones. On the one hand, if a new ideological group becomes dominant, some
Members of the old guard may be marginalized, prompting them to exit Congress.
On the other hand, if the party is divided, some may see an opportunity to target
Members of different ideological factions with a primary challenge in the hopes of
increasing the relative strength of their own faction.
This dissertation will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I propose a structural
theory of party change. In doing so, I argue that party networks cycle through periods
of structural deconsolidation and consolidation. When a party network deconsolidates, influence becomes more equitably distributed. This creates an opportunity
for some Members to expand their own influence. As some Members gain greater
influence at the expense of others, the party begins to consolidate. Once consolidated, the party enters a period of structural equilibrium. Sooner or later however,
the cycle will start over.
Because of these cycles, the core of the party network is often changing structurally and ideologically to some degree or another. Thus, I identify three types of
party core structures: 1) the establishment core is one that is dominated by a single
ideological group, and that dominance remains stable from one Congressional session
to another; 2) the new-guard core is also dominated by a single ideological group,
but has recently replaced another dominant group; and 3) the factional core is one
in which multiple ideological groups are competing for dominance. Finally, I discuss
three mechanisms of party change, assimilation, marginalization, and opportunity,
9

and argue that each type is more likely under different core structures.
The theory of party change rests on the assumption that party structures are
routinely fluctuating. Therefore, in Chapter 3, I construct and analyze both Republican and Democratic party networks for all Congressional sessions between 1998
and 2018. The networks are based on Member-to-Member electoral contributions. I
begin by discussing foundational concepts of Social Network Analysis, and the data
and methods used for constructing the party networks. I then analyze the networks
at multiple levels: the party level; the sub-party level; and the individual level. Party
level analysis suggests that, as polarization becomes more pronounced, parties in the
aggregate appear to increasingly behave as cohesive units consisting of mutually cooperative individuals—that is, everyone is helping everyone for the good of the party.
On the surface this would seem to imply that there is no influence structure, no distinction between core and periphery. However, sub-party analysis paints a more
nuanced picture of intra-party dynamics. When analyzing core-periphery structures,
it is clear that although parties sometimes engage in more mutually cooperative behavior, often time the lion’s share of the relationships are driven by a small groups
of individuals. This finding is further supported by individual level analysis, which
shows consideration variation in who is most influential and just how influential they
actually are.
In Chapter 4, I turn to analyses of the three mechanisms of party change. I
begin this chapter by testing each mechanism as a function of individual Member
influence. I find some evidence that peripheral Members tend to assimilate to the
ideological positions of their most core benefactors. However, the substantive effect is
10

relatively weak, suggesting that although party change does occur via assimilation,
it is likely an extremely slow process, a conclusion that echos the issue evolution
framework. I do find strong support that those who were once influential but have
been marginalized are the most likely to opt out of Congress. However, there appears
to be no indication that influence on its own is a predictor of opportunity, as measured
by primary challenges.
However, introducing structural effects—that is, whether the three mechanisms
are more likely under specific core structures—into the models adds some nuance to
these conclusions. Assimilation does appear to be affected by core structure, but it
is not necessarily more likely under an establishment core as predicted by the theory.
Marginalization is also not more likely under any particular core structure. The loss
of influence is a predictor of Congressional retirement under any structural condition.
However, as the theory predicts, primary challenges are highly specific to factional
core structures, but unlikely under other core structures.
This dissertation advances the literature on political parties in several ways.
First, while the theory acknowledges that Member behavior can be affected by both
external pressures and personal motives, it does not draw a distinction between the
two. Rather, the theory contends that all Member behavior, regardless of motive, is
both constrained and conditioned by the relationships they share with other Members. Second, the theory adds greater precision as well as an universal theoretical
impetus for the mechanisms of party change, which is generally lacking in the literature. In doing so, I find reinforcing evidence for the issue evolution framework’s
contention that party change is a slow process, but also find that incremental change
11

is more likely to occur via assimilation than replacement. Finally, the theory offers
a more generalizable framework for studying Member behavior in Congress. That is,
it treats the institutional power dynamic between party leadership and rank-and-file
Members, highlighted by Conditional Party Government (Aldrich and Rohde 2000b;
Rohde 2010) and Procedural Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 2005), as merely
one dimension of influence affecting intra-party relations.

12

Chapter 2:
Influence and Party Change
In the previous chapter, I presented the argument that parties are complex networks
of relationships. The nature and processes of party change are based on which
Members have the greatest influence in the party network at any given point in time.
In this chapter, I introduce a structural theory of party change which outlines that
argument in greater detail. However, doing requires weaving together several nuanced
concepts. Therefore, before proceeding to a discussion of the theory, I will begin this
chapter with a few conceptual definitions. This will include discussions of intra-party
influence, a structural conception of the political party, and the interactive nature
and implications of the party core and periphery.
Since the concept of influence is the linchpin of this theoretical framework, it
is important to define it at the outset. For the purposes here, influence refers to the
ability of an individual or group to affect another’s behavior. To be clear, however,
influence does not necessarily imply the ability to change another’s beliefs or policy
preferences, although neither does it preclude it. Moreover, influence stems from
some relational power advantage in the network—that is, influence is a function
of the relative power differential that exists in Member-to-Member relationships.
As the balance of power between two Members shifts, the Member who expands
their power relative to the other will increase their influence. Thus, a Member’s
intra-party influence is the cumulative power differential between themselves and
all other Members in the party network. Finally, influence may be derived from a
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number of sources including institutional positions of power, media attention, public
perceptions, or financial resources, to name just a few. And as we shall see, influence
is the driving force behind much of what transpires within a political party.
I define a political party in somewhat unconventional terms. I agree with Aldrich
(1995) that the function of a political party (in Congress) is to facilitate the resolution of collective action problems, and thereby serve the electoral and legislative
interests of its members. However, it is structurally far more complex. Rather than
conceptualize a party as a single dimensional institution, I argue that it consists of
four relational levels, each of which impacts the structure and function of the level
above. From micro to macro, the four structural levels include: 1) the individual
level (the individual Members); 2) the core-periphery level (the influencers and the
influenced); 3) the group level (organized according to ideology or policy preferences);
and 4) the party caucus level.
The unit at the most fundamental level of the party structure is the individual Member. Formally, MCs are independent actors. The behavior of the American legislator is far less institutionally constrained than those in many other liberal
democracies. That is not to say, however, that MCs are not susceptible to influence
from their colleagues. Virtually all MCs are connected to others through a variety
of social, economic, and institutional relationships.7 The dynamic of leverage oc7

Depending on how relationships are measured, there are certain instances in which a small
handful of MCs may be disconnected from the network (referred to as isolates). However, from
a practical standpoint, one would be hard-pressed to find any MC completely disconnected. One
possible exception—an extreme example, to be sure—might be Steve King of Iowa. After repeatedly
making racially inflammatory comments, King was publicly rebuked by the Republican Party and
was striped of all his committee assignment. It is unclear if King maintained any relationships with
any of his co-partisans after the admonishment. However, in the following election cycle, King lost
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curs when there is a power imbalance in these relationships. Additionally, every MC
varies to some degree in the amount of influence they have within the party network during a given Congressional session. Thus, the distribution of influence in the
network—that is, who has influence, and who is connected to whom—will determine
the core-periphery dynamic of the party at that point in time.
The core is defined as the group of individuals that possess the most influence
vis-à-vis their relative attributes and vast connections in the party network. Members
of the periphery, on the other hand, are less influential. This is because influence in
the party network is directional, necessarily flowing from the core to the periphery.
Thus, while peripheral Members are primarily connected to those in the core, they
are only sparsely (if at all) connected to each other. The core and the periphery can
be thought of as inversely related and structurally reciprocal. For example, if the
core is small and strong, the periphery will be large and weak. Conversely, as the
core gets larger and weaker, the periphery gets smaller and stronger.
Likewise, the distribution of influence between the core and periphery is on
a continuum. Theoretically, the influence distribution could range from perfectly
centralized to perfectly egalitarian. In the former instance, one individual would
have all of the influence, whereas influence would be equally distributed in the latter.8
The closer a network gets to distribution equality, the less distinguishable the coreperiphery structure would become.9
his seat to a primary challenger.
8
This of course is a conceptual exercise. In reality, there is no clear dichotomy between the core
and periphery and therefore no definitive demarcation between the two. Rather, influence in real
world networks is continuous, and therefore must be measured in terms of relative distribution.
9
I will discuss the operationalization of the core-periphery in the next chapter. However, al-
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It should be noted that every core-periphery dynamic will vary to some degree
based on the type of influence that is being measured. In fact, many scholars have
already convincingly demonstrated that institutional leadership can have a profound
effect on the behavior of rank-and-file Members either through expansion of leadership powers during times of Conditional Party Government (Aldrich and Rohde
2000b; Rohde 2010) or agenda control (Cox and McCubbins 2005). However, institutional power is only one dimension of intra-party influence. For example, some
rank-and-file Members may be influential because they capture significant media attention. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the Democratic Party or Matt Gaetz in the
Republican Party would be examples of how influence may not necessarily be based
on institutional positions of power. As measured here, the individual who has greater
influence is the one who is better able to harness the power of their Leadership PAC.
One caveat, however, is that while the strength of one’s Leadership PAC is
often positively correlated with other sources of influence, an MC may be influential
based solely on their Leadership PAC. A prime example of a high-influence Member
strictly in terms of Leadership PAC funds is Marjorie Taylor Greene. Greene is a
freshman MC who was stripped of her committee assignments shortly after being
seated, and has no other institutional positions of power. Nevertheless, she has
raised nearly 42 percent more in Leadership PAC funds than the average Member
(The Center for Responsive Politics 2020). Conversely, while Hakeem Jeffries is
Chair of the Democratic Caucus and serves on two powerful committees, he is not
particularly influential as measured by LPAC funds. In fact, in the previous election
though the structural dynamic of the core-periphery gets weaker for both parties during certain
years, all of the party networks maintain the structural integrity of a core-periphery network.
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cycle, Jeffries raised just 9 percent more than the average Member (The Center for
Responsive Politics 2020).
The third level of the party structure consists of groups that share a collective
ideology or interest. Many of these groups may be affiliated with and therefore
indirectly represent outside interests or activists—those often referred to as policy
demanders (Bawn et al. 2012; Baylor 2017; Cohen et al. 2009; Karol 2009; Masket
2011). However, while group-centered theorists contend that these groups actively
seek policy, I argue that depending who is in the core, these groups may either be
active or dormant. If a group has representation in the core (and therefore power and
influence in the network), it can activate its supporters in the periphery. Conversely,
if it has no representation in the core, periphery supporters will be forced to form
alternative alliances with core members of other groups.
An alternative conception of group policy mobilization is that coalition leaders strategically activate legislators according Members’ electoral concerns (Arnold
1990). Thus, rather than treating groups as static, Arnold’s conception implies that
groups are more fluid and ad hoc. Nevertheless, the ability of a coalition leader to
activate a policy group is also conditional upon which Members are influential in the
party network. Put simply, in order to understand the manifestation and behavior
of a coalition of intra-party groups, it is essential to first understand the Member
dynamics of the core (Krinsky and Crossley 2014). Ultimately, who is in the core
will determine which groups can mobilize and how influential they will be.10
10

It is important to point out that, while a discussion of group mobilization is necessary for
theoretical and conceptual context in this Chapter, the central empirical focus in Chapters 3 and 4
will be on the core-periphery and individual levels. Testing the dynamics of group mobilization is
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Finally, group-centric theorists are correct that parties are coalitions of groups
pushing the party in a favorable direction for themselves. However, not all groups
are active, and not all active groups have the same leverage in the coalition. Rather,
the party overall is a reflection of the influence that active groups have relative to
each other. Thus, if the core is dominated by one ideological group, the party caucus
in the aggregate will reflect that group in its behavior. But, if multiple groups are
represented in the core, the party will appear factionalized.

Cycles of Party Change
I begin this theory with the assumption that Members are rational individuals who
must balance multiple, sometimes competing interests. From the time of their election to the end of their tenure, they are motivated by their ideological beliefs and
policy preferences (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2000b). As Fenno (1978) suggests, an MC’s personal legislative motivations are shaped by what they believe to
be good policy. However, according to Bawn et al. (2012), they must also pursue
the interests of outside policy demanders. Which of these two motivations, when
in conflict, takes precedent at any given time is likely dependent upon a variety of
factors. Although this question is certainly worthy of pursuit, it is beyond the scope
of this research. Nevertheless, what is clear is that, as rational individuals, MCs are
keenly aware that in order to achieve any policy objectives they must be reelected
(Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974).
beyond the scope of this research.
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The implication of these assumptions is that policy objectives, whether personal
or in the interest of policy demanders, are almost always secondary to reelection.11
Perhaps the only exception is a policy that relates to an issue that is so important
to the MC, they are willing to sacrifice their career for it. Such a situation is, of
course, exceedingly rare. Therefore, it is clearly in the best interest of MCs to curry
favor and build alliances with Members who have resources, institutional leverage,
or popularity within the electorate at large. For more ambitious MCs, however, it
is not enough to simply ride to reelection with the help of influencers. It is also
important to become influencers themselves.
From this perspective, the distribution of influence in the party network—that
is, which Members are in the core or in the periphery at a given point in time—occurs
in cycles. To demonstrate this, let us take a hypothetical starting point in time (t).
At t, the core-periphery is at an equilibrium. Some MCs (Ci ) are in the core, and
others (Pi ) are in the periphery. Based on the ideology or policy preferences of Ci ,
some groups will be able to activate and mobilize supporters in the periphery and
others will not. Thus, the party at t is a reflection of the core equilibrium. Figure 1
shows the cycles through which core-periphery dynamics change.
11

One thing to keep in mind, however, is that the relative importance of reelection over policy is
likely to vary from individual to individual or group to group. In other words, some may consistently
exhibit “office-seeking” behavior, while others may at times exhibit “policy-seeking” behavior (See
Strom (1990)). For instance, establishment Members may want to preserve the status quo, and
therefore may not be willing to jeopardize the parties electoral success by pushing new policy
directions. Those in emerging factions may be more inclined to take that risk if there is a change
to push the party in a new direction.
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Figure 1: Cycles of Core-periphery Change

Most MCs, however, must actively work to maintain their influence (favorable
circumstances also play a role); influence is not something MCs inherently “just
have.”12 Therefore, it is typical for MCs’ influence to wax and wane over time, at
least to some degree. Influence fluctuations among core members may be the result of a number of factors, such as scandal, changes in individual approval ratings,
withdrawal from public or media attention, or failure to raise funds, to name just a
few. Regardless of the reason, a relative decrease in core member influence leads to
a more equitable distribution of influence among the periphery. I refer to this stage
12

The rare exception might be someone with widespread (usually national) name recognition.
For example, Joe Patrick Kennedy III may have some degree of influence for the simple fact that
he is part of the Kennedy family.
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as deconsolidation. When deconsolidation occurs, there is an opportunity for peripheral members to expand their own influence. They may do this by increasing their
public profile, jockeying for better institutional positions, or accumulating tangible
resources.13 It is also important to note that deconsolidation does not necessarily
mean that party change ceases, but rather we can expect a reversion to the mean as
forces of influence diminish.
After a period of deconsolidation, some Members will begin to emerge (or
reemerge as the case may be) as centers of influence. I refer to this period as
consolidation. During consolidation, the core-periphery will shift back to a more
hierarchical structure with a smaller number of more influential core members, and
a larger number of less influential periphery members.
Once the core and periphery consolidate, a new period of core equilibrium begins. One way to think about the core equilibrium is that it is commonly what is
referred to as the party “establishment.” The term establishment may carry with it
connotations of ideological centricity. In an era of increased polarization, this connotation is understandable. The anti-establishment often emerges from the pole side
to challenge the centrist establishment-wing of the party for dominance. In reality,
however, the establishment has nothing to do with ideological position. Rather, it
is simply the group that dominates the levers of institutional power. Often times,
the establishment consists of one ideologically oriented group.14 As we shall see,
13

As we shall see in the next chapter, starting a Leadership PAC or expanding its fundraising
capacity is one prominent way for an MC to increase their influence.
14
One example of this might be the New Democrats, an ideologically centrist, corporate-friendly
wing of the Democratic Party—sometimes referred to as Clinton Democrats, or later Obama
Democrats.
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however, depending on who is in the core, it is possible for the equilibrium to be a
coalition between a less powerful establishment and one or more ideological wings.
As such, the nature of the core can have a multitude of implications for the ways
in which each party functions as a legislative institution: its legislative agenda (if in
the majority), its approach to the majority’s legislative agenda (if in the minority),
leadership positions, and committee assignments, to name a few.
There are three possible consolidation scenarios and therefore, three possible
new equilibria. These scenarios are illustrated in Figures 2, 3, and 4. In these three
diagrams, each circle represents a member of the party caucus, and overlap(s) between circles represent connection(s). Cx (the larger circles) represent core members
and Px (the smaller circles) represent members of the periphery. Thus, the size of the
circles denotes amount of influence. For theoretical simplicity, the size of the circles
do not vary in the diagrams as they would in the real world. Likewise,the nature of
the overlaps are merely to illustrate relational variance and therefore should not be
interpreted literally. Ideological or policy groupings are represented by the line style
of each circle.15
The first scenario is one in which all (or most) of those who (re)emerge as centers of influence in the new core may be former members of the previous core. In
other words, the ideological group that dominates the new core is the same one that
dominated the previous core. Figure 2 illustrates this by showing how a homogeneous core is likely to induce homogeneity among a dependent periphery, even if the
15

Where available, circles are also color-coded to their corresponding grouping to make visual
differentiation easier.
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Figure 2: Core-periphery Scenario 1: Establishment Core
periphery is ideologically diverse. Please note that although the periphery contains
members with different ideological or policy preferences, they are connected to C1
through C4 who are all the same. I refer to this type of core structure as an establishment core because one ideological group dominates across multiple Congressional
sessions.
A second scenario is that a new core emerges that is dominated by a different
ideological group from that of the previous core. I refer to this type of structure as
a new-guard core because the ideological wing of the party that becomes dominant
replaces the old-guard in the party’s core. The scenario in Figure 3 shows how the
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core is homogeneous, but is different from the core in Figure 2.

Figure 3: Core-periphery Scenario 2: New-guard Core
Such a transition can happen in one of two ways. First, it may occur relatively
rapidly, perhaps over the course of an election or two. However, tectonic shifts of
such magnitude usually require some kind of exogenous shock (Harmel and Janda
1994). This might be a major social or economic event, a significant shift in the
electorate, the enactment of a contentious policy or set of policies, or the emergence
of a dynamic or divisive national figure (or some combination of these).16 Although
it is unclear if this type of transition necessarily constitutes a “realignment” per se (I
16

This is not an exhaustive list but should give the reader an idea of the types of events that
might cause a rapid party change.
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would argue that it does not), it is perhaps most similar theoretically to the notion
of a critical or realigning election.
Another way this scenario might happen is over a long period of time. For
instance, it might be the final stage in the culmination of protracted factional struggles in which one faction ultimately wins out and forces the party in a decisively
new direction. Alternatively, there may be a gradual replacement of core members
as the party goes through repeated cycles of core change described above. However,
because of the glacial speed at which this process unfolds, party changes would be
almost imperceptible to the average political observer, and may not be identifiable
at all without looking at a time span of years or possibly even decades. I would
argue that political parties are much like living organisms; they are always changing
at the cellular level. Therefore, this process is probably the most common way in
which parties change.
The third and final scenario is that the core is not dominated by any one
group. Rather, two or more groups emerge with representation is the new core. This
scenario is illustrated in Figure 4 in which C3 and C4 from Figure 2 are replaced by
C5 and C6 . Now, periphery Members have a choice of which core member(s) to align
with. When presented with such a choice, the rational MC will always align with
those who can help them electorally and who reflect their own preferences. When
accounting for rationally optimal alliance decisions, Figure 4 shows that changing
two core nodes from Figure 2 produces three ideologically aligned groups. Thus, I
refer to this structure as a factional core, since this type of influence distribution is
most likely to lead to the rise of party factions in Congress.
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Figure 4: Core-periphery Scenario 3: Factional Core
There are two caveats, however. First, although cross-over support (a core
Member supporting a periphery Member of a different faction) can and does happen,
ideological heterogeneity in the core means that Members in the periphery are now
able to pursue their own policy preferences. This is because they are no longer
beholden to the interests of those in other groups. Second, core factionalism does
not necessarily mean that the factions are constantly at war with each other. It
is important to remember that these are members of the same party and therefore
generally share many of the same interests and policy goals. Thus, it is still common
to see cooperation among party factions (Koger et al. 2010).
26

It is also important to keep in mind, however, that party change is not ideologically linear. In other words, party change does not imply that the party is
necessarily becoming consistently more extreme—although that happens to be the
trend during the current era of polarization in American politics (Theriault 2008).
Nor is the path of party change necessarily from extreme to moderate, as it was in
the post-New Deal era (Nokken and Poole 2004). Rather, party change can be—and
often is—non-linear in both the short-term and the long-term.

How Parties Change
Now that I have outlined the systemic, structural process that is the catalyst of party
change, what specifically are the mechanisms? Change does not happen simply because Members move in and out of a theoretical core of influence. Rather, depending
on the ideological characteristics of the core, party change may occur through one
of three mechanisms: assimilation, marginalization, or opportunity. The literature
on party change often discusses two mechanisms of change. The first is conversion,
sometimes referred to as adaptation. Conversion refers to Members changing their
positions on various issues to better fit with the party (Brunell et al. 2016; Fleisher
and Bond 2004; Karol 2009; Lee and Brady 2020; Theriault 2006). However, I use
the term assimilation instead of conversion or adaptation. Whereas conversion implies more permanent change, assimilation suggests that an MC has conformed but
not necessarily converted. While adaptation is more appropriate than conversion,
assimilation implies that the impetus for change is external—less a consequence of
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one’s own volition.
The second mechanism commonly identified in the literature is replacement.
Replacement refers to a general process in which one Member is replaced with another
Member with a different ideology or policy position (Carmines and Stimson 1989;
Fleisher and Bond 2004; Lee and Brady 2020; Theriault 2006). While I do not in
general take issue with the concept of replacement, I argue that it has been applied
too broadly. Although the outcome of replacement is ultimately the same, it occurs
through two different processes. The first is when an MC willing vacates a seat and
is replaced by another of the same party (Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Theriault
1998). The second is when an MC loses their seat in a primary challenge (Boatright
2013). It should be clear that the underlying impetus of each of these processes is
very different. On the one hand, a Member might respond to being marginalized
by a new-guard that has expanded their influence in the party by deciding to leave
Congress. On the other, intra-party divisions might be viewed as an opportunity to
challenge an MC of an opposing faction in a primary.
Moreover, each of these mechanisms is more likely to occur under certain structural conditions. Assimilation is more likely to occur under an establishment core
structure for two reasons. First, because one ideological group dominates, periphery
Members have little choice in who they form alliances with. Therefore, periphery
Members assimilate to better fit in with the dominant wing of the party. Second,
relative ideological stability means that most periphery Members are reasonably
comfortable—or at least familiar—with the status quo, so they will be more inclined
to go with the flow.
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It is worth noting that, while core Members may provide electoral support to
those in the periphery with whom they are aligned (after all, they want to bolster
their ally’s chances of reelection), they also will often support periphery Members
with whom they differ. First, doing so maximizes the electoral strength of the party
overall. And second, it gives those in the core greater leverage to shape the party’s
ideological position. To illustrate the concept of assimilation, I will discuss it in the
context of campaign funding.
According to Kim (2016) at the Center for Responsive Politics, the average
winning House candidate in 2012, 2014, and 2016 spent between 1.3 and 1.6 million.
If just 20 core members contributed the maximum allowed under federal law in
the general election, that would account for more than 6 percent of the average
campaign’s total fundraising haul. While this is certainly not an insignificant factor,
contributions for influence reasons are probably more likely in safe races. The reality
is that those in tight races will probably receive contributions more to defend the seat
and less to shape the party. Perhaps a more significant impact of the contribution
is that it produces political goodwill; it generates political capital which may prove
useful when it comes time to vote on a policy the core Member wants. To reiterate a
point made earlier, assimilation does not necessarily mean a Member changes their
beliefs, but rather that the peripheral Members reflects the ideology of the core
in their actions. This might explain why Karol (2009) finds flip-flopping among
Members to be so prevalent.
Like assimilation, marginalization is more likely to happen under a new-guard
core—a core that is dominated by one ideological group, but has recently replaced
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another. The reason is that those in the old-guard will be less comfortable going
along with the new direction of the party. Therefore, many—particularly those who
were once influential themselves—will resist attempts by the new-guard to assimilate them. The new-guard of the party will likely see these resisters as stubborn,
lacking vision, or simply out of touch and will try to push them out. If they are in
institutional positions of power, the new-guard may push a legislative agenda that
the old-guard cannot support, or they may deny the old-guard desirable committee
assignments (Coker and Crain 1994; Leighton and Lopez 2002) or restrict speaking time on the floor (Rybicki 2014). Otherwise, they may simply create a hostile
environment by mobilizing their supporters against the old-guard. Ultimately, the
Members of the old-guard will feel that their party has abandoned them, and that
they have little ability to change what the party has become. When faced with these
conditions, the Member may choose to exit professional politics.
Perceptions of electoral opportunity are more likely to arise when the core is
divided into factions. Just as division within elites creates space for the popular mobilization of a social movement (Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 2011) or the push for democratic
reforms (Przeworski 1991), so too do the divisions within a party create electoral opportunity to challenge an incumbent. Although party factions are often capable
of cooperating during legislative session (Koger et al. 2010), elections provide the
perfect opportunity to add an ally at the expense of an opposing faction member.
However, since maintaining party strength is of the utmost importance, primaries
are not likely to happen in competitive districts unless the incumbent is exceptionally weak. Instead, the battlefield of factional advancement is the safe district. But,
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as Burden (2001) points out, primaries create a centrifugal force that work against
the natural tendency of moderation in a two-party system. Thus, whether the incumbent wins or loses, primary challenges usually push the parties toward the poles.
The implication of this is that intra-party factionalism indirectly leads to increases
in party polarization.
Before concluding, I would like to illustrate the theory with a real-world example. In doing so, I will return the discussion of the Tea Party from Chapter 1.
Recall that in mid-2010, Michelle Bachmann started the Tea Party Caucus, which
52 sitting Republican MCs joined (Gervais and Morris 2012). This was before a
single Tea Party-backed candidate was elected. For many of these individuals, including Bachmann herself, this was not their first session in Congress. In other
words, many of these Members—perhaps most—were in Congress when the dominant group was the “establishment” that the Tea Party railed against. Yet, they
never formed an ideological opposition; nor did they vote as a bloc against them.
Instead, they assimilated—they went along to get along. This was the party under
an establishment core.
But, once Tea Party candidates started getting elected, the balances of power
and influence in the Republican caucus started to shift along ideological lines. The
Tea Party, now an organized group, began challenging the establishment for dominance. This shifted the party structure from an establishment core to a factional
core. As a result, many more Tea Party candidates capitalized on opportunities to
challenge establishment Republicans in primary elections. Eventually, the Tea Party
became the dominant ideological group. This change in dominance marginalized
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many in the old establishment, some of whom opted to exit professional politics.
There are two points about core structures and mechanisms of party change
that must be emphasized. One is that core structures do not emerge in any particular order. One might assume that the natural order of progression is that an
establishment core morphs into a factional core which in turn transitions to a newguard core (which then becomes the new establishment). To be sure, this process
can and does happen. And I would argue that this is the way the process played
out during the Tea Party era. However, other scenarios are equally plausible. It is
possible, for instance, that an establishment core could become a new-guard core
very rapidly, without the interim factional stage. Likewise, an establishment core
might become factionalized, but then revert back to the establishment if the rising
faction is suppressed. Or, the factional core could become entrenched, and the party
could exist as a tentative coalition that sometimes erupts into conflict. This last
scenario, I would argue, has been the state of the Democratic Party since 2016. The
moderate and progressive wings of the party often work together. However, when
a highly consequential policy comes along, such as the current infrastructure bills,
both factions try to flex their ideological muscles. Put simply, structural changes
are very fluid. The second point is that the mechanisms are not mutually exclusive.
Theses mechanisms can, and often do, occur together. The argument made here
is simply that mechanisms of party change are more likely under certain structural
conditions.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have proposed a structural theory of party change. In doing so,
I have argued that political parties in Congress are multi-tier structures that are
shaped by the dynamics of individual and group influence. During periods of equilibrium, the party is a reflection of the ideological make-up of the core—the group
of members who have the most influence in the party network. However, periods of
deconsolidation create the opportunity for others to expand their own influence and
become a part of the core. The new core, once established, will then usher in the
next equilibrium.
Changes in the ideological structure of the core can elicit three mechanisms of
party change. If the core is relatively homogeneous and stable, peripheral members
will be more likely to assimilate to the party line. They will ”go along to get along.”
If, however, the core has undergone near complete transformation, many in the oldguard will disapprove of the new direction of the party and refuse to assimilate. In
response, the new-guard will marginalize the resisters, who will be more likely to exit
political life, especially if they were once influential themselves in the party. Finally,
if multiple groups are competing for influence in the core, some may see the divisions
as an opportunity to pick off an opposing faction member.
In the next chapter, I will use Social Network Analysis to descriptively analyze
multiple levels of the party structure. Based on the results, I will derive measures
of the core-periphery for each party network from 1998 to 2018. I will also render
a measure of individual influence—a “coreness” coefficient—for every MC in each
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party across time. These measures will be applied in Chapter 4 to empirically test
the three mechanisms of party change presented here. If this theory stands up to the
rigors of testing, each of these mechanisms should be more likely under the structural
conditions outlined in this chapter.
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Chapter 3:
Influence and Party Networks
The understanding of political parties as networks of interconnected actors has existed in the literature for decades. For some, the structural nature of parties is
implicit in their function. Anthony Downs (1957, p.137), for instance, characterized
a party as a “team” of individuals with the common goal of “running the government apparatus.” Likewise, E. E. Schattschneider (1948, 1960b) viewed parties as
organizations specifically designed to gain control of government.
However since Downs and Schattschneider, many scholars have more explicitly
recognized the importance of conceptualizing parties as networks. These scholars not
only account for the attributes of party actors, but also the relationships between
them. This understanding of the political party began with people like Schlesinger
(1985), who argued that parties are collections of interconnected “nuclei” seeking to
win elected office. Thus, he points out that “[t]he multinuclear party organization
consists of all efforts to link nuclei together. These efforts may consist of deliberate
acts such as the transfer of money or endorsements” (Schlesinger 1985, p.1153). Similarly, in looking at the implications of Member-to-Member contributions, Bedlington
and Malbin (2003, p.121) argued that parties are best conceptualized as a “series
of interwoven relationships.” It is important to note, however, that Schlesinger and
Bedlington and Malbin do not draw the distinction between party-in-government
and what many have termed the Extended Party Network—those outside interests
and activists pushing the policy agenda (Bawn et al. 2012; Baylor 2017; Cohen et al.
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2009; Karol 2009; Masket 2011). Although I do not challenge the importance or role
of external party actors theoretically, empirically I wish to focus exclusively on the
party-in-government.
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to construct and analyze each party as a
network of interconnected actors in the House of Representatives across the past two
decades. Doing so will serve as the empirical foundation upon which to model and
test several implications of the structural theory of party change introduced in the
previous chapter. This chapter will proceed as follows. The first section deals with
the data and methodological approaches I use to construct the party networks. Thus,
I will begin with a brief overview of Social Network Analysis—a multidisciplinary
methodological approach used in measuring and testing interconnected social groups
(Borgatti et al. 2018; Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Scott 2017)—in order to acquaint
the reader with some fundamental terms and concepts. I then discuss the processes
I use for constructing the party networks. Specifically, House Members from each
party caucus in each Congressional session form a network of relationships based on
Leadership PAC contributions.
The second section will be both descriptive and analytical. Here I will discuss
three structural levels: the party level (the party as a series of aggregate networks);
the sub-party level (core-periphery dynamics within each party network); and the
individual level (Members as actors—or nodes—in each network).17 I find that,
when looked at through a macro lens, parties appear to behave consistently with
17

For the purposes here, I do not explicitly deal with groups as a distinct level, but groups may
be identified via core-peripheral analysis.
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the conventional wisdom that as parties grow increasingly polarized they become
more unified and homogeneous (Aldrich and Rohde 2005; Bond and Fleisher 2000;
Fleisher and Bond 2004; Jacobson 2000; Poole and Rosenthal 2000, 2001; Sinclair
2000). However, an analysis of the sub-party level reveals a much more nuanced—
albeit not necessarily inconsistent—picture of party dynamics. Specifically, parties
cycle through varying degrees of structural change: sometimes parties are more hierarchically structured; other times they are more egalitarian.
It is important to remember that, while the results do appear to offer tentative support for the claim that structural changes in influence impact party change,
this chapter is not intended to demonstrate causality—there simply are not enough
network and sub-network level observations. Rather, the purpose is to illustrate
party network dynamics and to set the empirical stage for testing the mechanisms of
party change in the next chapter. Therefore, in the final section, I turn to individual Members’ positional influence in the party networks. In doing so, I derive and
descriptively evaluate coreness coefficients—a proxy for individual influence—for all
Members in the party networks. The coreness coefficient will serve as the primary
independent variable in testing assimilation, marginalization, and opportunity in the
next chapter.

Parties as Networks
In order to get a sense of the party networks over time, I use Social Network Analysis (SNA) to evaluate structural changes in the Republican and Democratic Party
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caucuses in Congress from 1998 to 2018. Based on graph theory, SNA is a methodological approach used to construct networks of actors connected through relational
ties, to measure network characteristics, and to test related hypotheses (Borgatti
et al. 2018; Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Scott 2017). While SNA has a long, rich
history in many social science disciplines,18 it has increasingly been used in political
science in recent years (Ward et al. 2011). For instance, political scientists have used
SNA to provide novel perspectives on wide-ranging topics including terrorist networks (Krebs 2002; Ressler 2006), legislative behavior (Fowler 2006; Tam Cho and
Fowler 2010), committee relationships (Porter et al. 2005), campaign contributions
(Koger and Victor 2009a,b; McClurg and Philips 2011), and political parties (Blum
2016; Koger et al. 2010; Lee and Goff 2021; Parigi and Sartori 2014).

Social Network Analysis
Before proceeding to the discussion on data and methods, it is first important to
outline some preliminary terminology and concepts. For convenience, I have included
a list of relevant terms and definitions in Table 1 below. I have also included a glossary
of terms in Appendix A of the dissertation. I strongly encourage anyone not familiar
with SNA to refer to the list of terms and definitions below or the glossary when
reading through this chapter and the next.

18

For additional reading, see Moreno (1960); Moreno and Jennings (1938); White et al. (1976)
and Freeman (2004).
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Table 1: Terms and Definitions
Terms

Definitions

Alter

All nodes that are connected to the ego in an ego network

Asymmetric
Network

See Directed Network

Attribute

A trait or characteristic that all nodes in a network share.

Cohesion

The extent to which a network as a whole is connected.

Compactness

A measure of cohesion, calculated as density as well as geodesic
distance.

Continuous
Model

A node-level measure that estimates the “coreness” of each individual in a network.

Coreperiphery
Network

A network structure characterized by a hierarchy of importance
or influence.

Coreness
Coefficient

A coefficient produced by the continuous model for how central
each individual node is in the overall party network; the coreness
coefficient is measured on a scale of 0-1 with 1 representing
perfect centrality, or the highest level influence in the network.

Density

A measure of cohesion, calculated as the proportion of possible
edges that are realized in a network.

Directed
Network

A network in which the initiation of a relationship takes on
meaning. (i.e. Tom donates to Sally)

Discrete
Model

A network-level measure that estimates how well a network approximates a perfect core-periphery structure.

39

Edges

Relationships that tie actors in a network together. (i.e. a
financial transaction is an edge)

Ego

The primary node of focus in an ego network.

Ego Network

A personal network in which the primary node of focus is the
ego.

Fitness
Coefficient

A coefficient produced by the discrete model for how well a
network approximates a core-periphery structure; the fitness
coefficient is measured on a scale of 0-1 with 1 representing a
perfect core-periphery structure.

Geodesic
Distance

The shortest path between any given pair of nodes.

Homophily

In an ego network, the extent to which alters are similar to their
ego along an identified attribute.

Isolates

Nodes that are fully disconnected from all other nodes.

Network

A collection of individual actors that share one or many social
or institutional attributes.

Nodes

Individual actors within a network. (i.e. Tom and Sally are
both nodes)

Symmetric
Network

See Undirected Network

Undirected
Network

A network in which all connections between actors count as
relationships, regardless of who initiates the relationship. (i.e.
Tom and Sally have a financial relationship)
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To begin, a social network is a collection of individual actors that share one
or many social or institutional attributes. Based on these attributes, actors form a
relational network. The network may further be divided into discrete or overlapping
subgroups. Actors in the network are referred to as nodes or vertices, and based on
their relationships and position, may take on a variety roles in the network.
The structure and characteristics of the network are functions of the relationships that tie the nodes together. Network relationships are usually referred to as
edges, connections, or ties. These relationships may be directed—or asymmetric—
meaning that only ties that go from one actor to another will count as an edge. An
example of when it might be appropriate to treat a network as directed would be
when the relationship is a financial contribution (i.e. from donor to recipient). In
this instance, the donor initiates the relationship, but it need not be reciprocated. If
the donation was reciprocated, that would be considered a separate edge. However,
relationships may also be undirected—or symmetric—meaning that any connection
between two nodes, regardless of direction, counts as an edge. Therefore, the theoretical nature of a relationship should determine whether a network is treated as
directed or undirected (Borgatti et al. 2018).
Node measures may also be a function of whether a network is directed or
undirected. For instance, centrality in a directed network may be defined by whether
the relationship of interest is outgoing or incoming (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
If centrality is defined as outgoing, the actor who initiates the relationship will be
measured as more central in the network. Conversely, if centrality is defined as
incoming, actors who are recipients of the relationship will be measured as more
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central. Thus, interpretations will differ depending on whether centrality is outgoing
or incoming. As Hanneman and Riddle (2005) point out, outgoing centrality is
usually indicative of influence, whereas incoming centrality may be interpreted as
prestige. Like directionality, ultimately the way centrality is defined is a theoretical
consideration.
Finally, edges may be either binary or weighted. If the network relationships
are binary, then the ties have no particular value. Edges are simply coded as 1
if a relationship is present and 0 if no relationship exists. If the relationships are
weighted, then the edges vary in strength according to the value. To use the example
of a monetary contribution once again, in a weighted network, a relationship would
be defined as stronger if more money is contributed. However, in a binary network,
the value of the transaction would not be taken into account.
Based on the relational dynamics of the nodes in a network, multiple levels of
analysis may be conducted. Network-level measures such as density or path distance, for example, will provide good indications of how well connected or efficient
a network is, respectively (Borgatti et al. 2018; Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Scott
2017). However, as will soon become clear, while network-level measures may offer a sense of overall network characteristics, they do not effectively uncover what
is going on within the network (Borgatti et al. 2018). This is where sub-network
and node-level measures are useful. Sub-network measures capture more precisely
the internal structural dynamics of a networks. For instance, sub-network measures
such as cliques or factions can detect how nodes in the network cluster together into
identifiable communities. Likewise, sub-network measures such as core-periphery can
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determine groupings by influence in the network. Finally, node-level measures such
as an actor’s importance or position in the network can indicate their influence over
other individual actors.

Constructing Party Networks
Since I assume that Members are concerned primarily with being reelected, it is
appropriate to construct party networks based on electoral relationships. And there
is arguably no better measure of electoral influence than campaign contributions.
Therefore, I use Leadership PAC (LPAC) contributions between House members of
the same party to establish relational edges.19 LPACs are fundraising committees
established by MCs (as well as other political elites) to assist the campaigns of other
candidates running for political office.
LPAC contributions are an ideal measure of relational influence for several reasons. First, because of their importance to political campaigns, LPAC contributions
necessarily reflect a power imbalance which favors the donor. Moreover, the amount
of each contribution must by law be reported to the Federal Elections Commission.
Therefore, unlike other displays of electoral support like endorsements, LPAC contributions allow for the weighting of relationships. Finally, because of their ubiquity
among Members, LPAC contributions generate enough connections to meaningfully
interpret.
19

In each session there are typically a small handful of cross-party contributions. However, since
the analytical unit of interest is the party, I disregard contributions from Members of one party to
Members of another.
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Moreover, LPACs are quite ubiquitous among MCs. In the early 1990s, LPACs
were almost exclusively established by the party leadership in Congress. During that
time there would have been very little distinction between the influence stemming
from institutional positions of power and influence derived from LPACs. By 1998,
however, the number of Members with LPACs had grown to approximately 20 percent of total Members, as many rank-and-file Members began to establish their own
LPACs (The Center for Responsive Politics 2020). And by 2006, those with LPACs
accounted for nearly two-thirds of all Members. Thus, LPACs are a means for the
average rank-and-file Member to expand their own influence in the party (The Center
for Responsive Politics 2020).
LPAC contributions were collected from The Center for Responsive Politics
(2020) (CRP), a non-profit organization dedicated to transparency in campaign finance. CRP aggregates FEC data which streamlines the data collection process. All
LPAC transactions were retrieved in edgelist format, which included the name of the
donor, the name of the recipient, the amount of the contribution, and the year of the
election cycle in which the transaction took place—there is no specific date in which
the contribution took place, only the election cycle. So, if a contribution was made
anytime between the 2004 and 2006 elections, it is coded as 2006. It is also important
to note that according to the Federal Election Commission (2020), LPAC contributions are limited to $5000 per individual candidate, per election, with the primary
and general counting as separate elections. Therefore, an edge can be weighted from
1 to 10000.20 No contribution means there is no connection and therefore it is coded
20

It should be pointed out that one potential criticism of using weighting edges based on LPAC
contributions is that Members with greater fundraising capacity are able to contribute more
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as 0.
This master edgelist was then separated into smaller edgelists by year to correspond with each election cycle. I then used UCINET, an analytical software package
designed specifically for network analysis (Borgatii et al. 2002), to convert the edgelist into an N x N adjacency matrix,21 in which N represents the total number
of MCs in the House. I treat the networks as weighted, so cell Aij represents the
value of the tie—in this case, the amount of the LPAC contribution. I also treat the
networks as directed, meaning only donor-to-recipient edges are considered. Each
election cycle network was then divided into two additional networks according to
node party affiliation. This yielded a total of twenty-two networks: a network for
both the Republican and the Democratic Party for every election cycle from 1998 to
2018.22

Modeling the Party: Cohesion
To get a sense of general party trends over time, I begin with a descriptive analysis
at the party level. Although there are many network characteristics that may be
throughout the network. On the surface it might appear that such variance in fundraising capacity might artificially inflate the measure of influence for those Members who raise more money.
However, previous research has demonstrated that a primary reason MCs develop their LPAC
fundraising capacity is to expand their influence in the party (Currinder 2003; Kanthak 2007; Robbins 2009; Wilcox 1989). Therefore, since fundraising capacity is itself an indicator of influence,
such concerns are unwarrented.
21
Although either edgelists or adjacency matrices may be used in network analysis, I opted to
use adjacency matrices because they are less computationally demanding.
22
2020 was initially included in the analysis. However, at the time the data were collected, only
half of the 2020 cycle was available. Since much of the transactional data tends to occur closer to
the next election than the previous election, 2020 presented as an outlier in every in measure.
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measured using SNA, the most useful for the purposes here is network cohesion. One
of the most widely analyzed whole-network characteristics (Scott 2017), cohesion
refers to the extent to which a network is connected. In the context of Memberto-Member LPAC contribution, cohesion should be interpreted as how electorally
cooperative the party is overall.
There are countless measures of network cohesion, but I opted to use two of
the most common. The first, density, is the proportion of possible edges that are
realized in the network. Table 2 below shows that between 1998 and 2018, the
Democratic Party’s density ranged from 0.7 percent to just over 5 percent, while the
Republican Party ranged from 1.3 percent to 8.4 percent. The mean density for the
Democrats and the Republicans was 2.8 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively. This
would suggest that during this time the Republicans were approximately 61 percent
more actively engaged in peer-to-peer electoral support, and thus more cooperative
at the party level than the Democrats. Additionally, as Figure 5 shows, both parties
demonstrate a general trend toward greater density over time.
One concern, however, with measuring cohesion via density is that isolates—
that is, nodes that are fully disconnected from all other nodes—can artificially deflate
the density score and thus obscure actual cohesion of the network’s primary component.23 Therefore, I opted to also run network compactness to serve as a robustness
check. Compactness not only measures the density of the primary component, it
also measures the geodesic distance—the average shortest path between any given
23

A network component is “the maximal set of nodes in which every node can reach every other
by some path” (Borgatti et al. 2018, p.18).
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Table 2: Density and Compactness by Party
Year

Dem Density

GOP Density

Dem Compact

GOP Compact

1998

0.007

0.013

0.008

0.015

2000

0.012

0.026

0.014

0.065

2002

0.016

0.031

0.02

0.078

2004

0.018

0.042

0.021

0.102

2006

0.015

0.063

0.022

0.135

2008

0.028

0.044

0.059

0.092

2010

0.046

0.03

0.134

0.087

2012

0.04

0.05

0.13

0.164

2014

0.051

0.047

0.13

0.249

2016

0.039

0.063

0.134

0.296

2018

0.039

0.084

0.137

0.324

Mean

2.8

4.5

7.4

14.6
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Figure 5: Changes in Network Cohesion—Density
pair of nodes. Again, Table 2 shows that Democrats have a compactness range of 0.8
percent to 13.7 percent with a mean of 7.4 percent, while the Republicans range from
1.5 percent to 32.4 percent with a mean of 14.6 percent. Thus, Figure 6 illustrates
that when using compactness, the general trends are similar: both parties become
more cohesive over time, but the Republicans tend to be more cooperative than the
Democrats overall.24
So, what might we extrapolate from these trends, and how does that reconcile
24

It is worth noting that most of the Democrat’s increase in cohesion occurs between the 109th
and the 111th Congresses. Increases during other Congress, although present, are much more
modest.
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Figure 6: Changes in Network Cohesion—Compactness
with conventional wisdom about political parties? Recall, I assume that Members
are primarily interested in reelection. However, since the policy differences between
the parties become so stark during periods of polarization, the drive for reelection
should intensify as the parties drift further apart ideologically. Therefore, I expect
the following:
Hypothesis 1: As the parties grow increasingly polarized, there will be a
corresponding increase in party-level cohesion.
To test this hypothesis, I ran a pairwise correlation between both measures
of cohesion—density and compactness—and ideological party median by Congres49

sional session. The ideological median scores are taken from the DW-NOMINATE
database. NOMINATE, arguably one the most widely utilized measures of ideology
in the literature on political parties and Congress, derives ideology scores based on
Member roll call votes (Lewis et al. 2020). It is important to note that NOMINATE
measures ideology on a scale of -1 for more Liberal to 1 for more Conservative. Therefore, to standardize the measure, I took the absolute value of the NOMINATE score
(i.e. the higher the score, the more extreme the median ideology of the party).
With a correlation coefficient of 0.66, there appears to be a strong positive correlation between network cohesion—as measured by density—and party polarization.
I then reran the pairwise correlation, but instead used the compactness measure.
This time the positive correlation was stronger with a coefficient of 0.812. These
results are noteworthy because, despite using different measures from previous research,25 they support the conventional wisdom that parties become more unified as
they grow increasingly polarized. However, it must be pointed out that although
both correlations returned a statistical significance of p < .001, the results should be
interpreted cautiously since there are only 22 network observations to include.

Modeling the Sub-party: Core-periphery
I then turned to sub-party analyses. Like with cohesion, there are a variety of
approaches for identifying and measuring a network’s internal structure. I began with
a series of community detection methods to determine whether there was any notable
25

For examples of alternative measures in the literature, see Jacobson (2000), Sinclair (2000),
and Fleisher and Bond (2004)
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groupings within the party caucuses. Specifically I tested for clustering, cliques,
and factions.26 I also ran the Girvan-Newman and Louvain algorithms which use
the fast-greedy method—a more efficient community detection approach optimized
for larger networks (Blondel et al. 2008; Ghosh et al. 2018; Girvan and Newman
2002). Although each of these methods detected the existence of some sub-network
grouping, the results were largely inconclusive. A look at hierarchical clustering
dendrograms for each network provided a likely explanation for why the community
detection algorithms struggled. Although there were sub-groups present in each of
the networks, there was also extensive overlapping and nesting of the communities.
One interpretation might be that while Members may be more likely to donate to
those in their sub-community, they also routinely donate to Members outside of their
group which blurs the differentiation between groups.27
I then conducted core-periphery structural analysis which yielded more tangible
results. A core-periphery structure is one in which the nodes are classified hierarchically according to importance or influence. In a core-periphery structure, core nodes
tend to be highly connected to each other and to periphery nodes, whereas nodes
in the periphery tend to be connected to core nodes but only sparsely—if at all—
connected to each other (Borgatti and Everett 2000; Rombach et al. 2014). Figure 7
below shows the core-periphery structure of the Democratic Caucus for the 115th
Congress. Please note that the relationships are much denser around the center of
the network and become considerably more sparse the further out toward the edges
26

Although each of these approaches define sub-groups in slightly different ways, they are generally looking for the same types of internal structural elements.
27
For an example and description of hierarchical clustering in a party network, see the dendrogram
included in Appendix B
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of the graph.28

Figure 7: Core-periphery Network—Democratic Caucus (2018)
Borgatti and Everett (2000) developed two ways to estimate core-periphery
structures: the discrete model and the continuous model. The discrete model estimates each node’s connectedness and then assigns that node as either core or periphery. It then uses block-modeling to calculate the number of network errors—that is,
instances in which there are periphery-to-periphery ties (Borgatti and Everett 2000).
The discrete model then returns a fitness coefficient for how closely the network re28

In this graph, core nodes are denoted by circles and peripheral nodes are denoted by upside down
triangles. For simplicity purposes, this graph presents a dichotomous core-periphery as measured
by the discrete model.
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flects a perfect core-periphery network structure. The fitness coefficient ranges from 0
to 1, with 0 being a completely random network and 1 being a perfect core-periphery
structure. But, while it is theoretically possible to estimate multiple structural levels (i.e. core—semi-periphery—periphery), Borgatti and Everett (2000, p.385) point
out that estimation and interpretation become increasing difficult as more levels are
added.
Therefore, in order to overcome these problems, Borgatti and Everett (2000)
developed an alternative approach: the continuous model. Rather than categorizing
each node dichotomously, as the discrete model does, the continuous model measures
individual node “coreness”— that is, how well each node would fit into the core of an
ideal network (Borgatti and Everett 2000). Like the fitness coefficient, the coreness
coefficient is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, with 0 being completely disconnected
and 1 being perfectly central in the network.
It should be noted that coreness approximates eigenvector centrality, which
takes into account the centrality of adjacent nodes (Bonacich 1987). However, there
are two reasons that coreness is a more suitable measure of Member influence than
eigenvector centrality. First, while all core Members can be defined as central, it
is possible for someone to have a high eigenvector centrality score and not be part
of the core. For instance, let us assume that Member A is the sole link between
two factions. While Member A may be important as a means of communication
between the factions, that does not mean they are influential in either faction. In
this example, Member A would be highly central but not necessarily influential.
Coreness, on the other hand, assumes a hierarchical network structure. So, those
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who are central are also necessarily influential. Therefore, eigenvector centrality
may inappropriately classify peripheral nodes as influential when they are not. This
is a subtle but important distinction to make, nonetheless. The second reason is
that eigenvector centrality in directed networks can sometimes produce inconsistent
results because a node that has a centrality value of zero will transfer that value to
its connections (Borgatti et al. 2018).

The Discrete Model: The Sub-party Structure
I began analysis of the sub-party structure by running the discrete model for both the
Democratic and Republican Parties during each Congressional session. The model
returned core-periphery fitness coefficients which are listed in Table 3. According
to Borgatti and Everett (2000, p.381) a fitness coefficient above 0.5 would reflect a
“strong but far from perfect fit with the ideal” core-periphery structure. However,
real world networks also never perfectly fit core-peripheral characteristics and thus
never approach the ideal fitness coefficient of 1. Therefore, networks must be interpreted comparatively. With this in mind, I have also included the number of standard
deviations each fitness coefficient is above or below the corresponding party’s mean.
As we can see from Table 3, on the low end, the Democratic Party and Republican Party have a core-periphery fitness coefficient of 0.531 and 0.578, respectively.
This would suggest that both parties consistently exhibited reasonably strong coreperiphery structures during this time period. However, the parties also varied considerably in how well structured their networks were. While the Democratic Party
ranged from 0.531 to 0.638—a difference of approximately 10 percentage points—the
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Table 3: Core-periphery Network Fit
Year

Dem Coef.

Dem # Std.Dev.

GOP Coef.

GOP # Std.Dev.

1998

0.638

1.417

0.637

-0.282

2000

0.5951

-0.04

0.628

-0.573

2002

0.588

-0.258

0.632

-0.444

2004

0.628

1.198

0.66

0.462

2006

0.587

-0.294

0.697

1.659

2008

0.604

0.324

0.682

-0.121

2010

0.531

-2.335

0.658

0.397

2012

0.571

-0.877

0.578

-2.191

2014

0.623

1.017

0.636

-0.315

2016

0.59

-0.185

0.642

-0.121

2018

0.597

0.033

0.693

1.52
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Figure 8: Cycles of Change by Party
Republican Party ranged from 0.578 to 0.697—a difference of nearly 12 percentage
points.
I have included a visual depiction of the cycles of change in Figures 8 and
9. Figure 8 shows the structural cycles as measured by raw fitness coefficients,
while Figure 9 used the standard deviations to normalize the fitness coefficients for
comparative purposes. The fitness coefficient ranges suggest two things. First, the
Republican Party on average is more structured, yet slightly more volatile than the
Democratic Party. Second, the variance suggests that the distribution of influence
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Figure 9: Cycles of Change by Party—Normalized
within both parties fluctuated between periods of being highly centralized and more
decentralized, while still maintaining their structural integrity. This would provide
some evidence that the parties go through cycles, as the structural theory of party
change suggests.
However, while the figures clearly shows how each party trends in their structural cycles, there are certain structural anomalies that occur between 2006 and
2012. First, heading into 2006 it appears the GOP was leaning into the Neoconservatism of the Bush years, while the Democrats exhibit deconsolidation, likely to
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distinguish themselves from the GOP—many Democrats, after all, had gone along
with Republicans in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. After winning the
House and Senate in 2006, Democrats shifted to focus on the perceived failures of
the Bush administration and a more progressive domestic agenda. Republicans, during this time, recognized the unpopularity of the their agenda and began distancing
themselves from Bush and the Neoconservative ideology.
In 2008, Democrats expanded their margins in both chambers of Congress and
won the White House. However, the GOP identified a growing unease in the electorate with some of the Democratic policies and began consolidating around opposition to the Obama administration. Democrats almost certainly saw the writing
on the electoral wall, and between 2008 and 2010 exhibited massive deconsolidation
followed by a significant reconsolidation over the next two election cycles. I would
argue that this structural swing represents two things. First, the Democrats overestimated their mandate and the American appetite for expansive progressive policies
such as the Affordable Care Act. In response to losing the House and taking significant losses in the Senate in 2010, the Democrats shifted in a decisively centrist
direction until the end of Obama’s second term.
Likewise, the Republicans also experienced a significant deconsolidation between 2010 and 2012, and then a reconsolidation between 2012 and 2014. I would
argue that the deconsolidation was in response to the electoral success of the Tea
Party in 2010, which shook the party up ideologically. However, between 2012 and
2014, the GOP began to reconsolidate with many Tea Party Members now at the
core of the party. Ultimately, the purpose in highlighting these trends is to illustrate
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that structural cycles do not occur in a vacuum. They are often impacted by a variety of factors, including which party is in the majority, the size of that majority, a
party’s policies, and the mood of the electorate at any given point in time.

The Continuous Model: Individual Member Coreness
While the discrete model is an effective approach for comparing core-periphery structures across networks, it is limited in that it does not tell us anything about variation
at the individual Member level. Therefore, the benefits of also using the continuous
model are twofold. First, the continuous model captures much more nuance in how
individual level influence is distributed throughout the party networks. The benefit
of using the discrete and the continuous models in tandem, therefore, is that it provides the ability to triangulate the effects of influence at both the party level and
the individual level simultaneously. Second, the continuous model produces a coreness coefficient for each individual MC. This coefficient will be essential in the next
chapter when testing how influence affects Member behavior, and how that behavior
translates into party change.
So, how are parties structured when looking at individual influence? Table 4
and Table 5 present descriptive statistics based on individual coreness coefficients
for the Democratic Party and Republican Party, respectively. Not surprisingly, the
overall picture of the network structures for each party using the continuous model
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Table 4: Democratic Party Member Coreness Descriptive Statistics
Year

Mean

Median

Std Dev.

Skewness

Kurtosis

1998

0.057

0.029

0.091

4.41

28.486

2000

0.05

0.025

0.081

4.228

26.39

2002

0.038

0.015

0.072

4.705

31.161

2004

0.055

0.031

0.076

3.478

19.164

2006

0.049

0.019

0.073

3.036

15.726

2008

0.041

0.017

0.061

2.936

13.551

2010

0.04

0.025

0.054

4.482

29.521

2012

0.044

0.023

0.062

3.651

22.387

2014

0.047

0.023

0.059

1.939

7.201

2016

0.046

0.022

0.062

2.309

8.464

2018

0.042

0.019

0.061

3.391

17.538
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Table 5: Republican Party Member Coreness Descriptive Statistics
Year

Mean

Median

Std Dev.

Skewness

Kurtosis

1998

0.033

0.006

0.067

3.929

22.012

2000

0.039

0.013

0.063

2.908

12.841

2002

0.041

0.017

0.061

2.556

11.414

2004

0.042

0.018

0.056

1.758

5.848

2006

0.045

0.025

0.054

1.99

7.548

2008

0.044

0.023

0.061

3.41

18.987

2010

0.038

0.017

0.071

6.095

52.863

2012

0.035

0.018

0.056

5.624

43.969

2014

0.034

0.016

0.057

6.257

57.098

2016

0.036

0.02

0.053

5.082

41.932

2018

0.037

0.022

0.052

5.157

39.652
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is largely reflective of the depiction of the core-periphery from the discrete model.
The positive skewness and consistently greater mean than median suggests that the
parties are distributed towards a less influential group of peripheral Members but
then tend to taper off to a smaller subset of Members with greater influence. This
provides reinforcing evidence that the parties exhibit core-periphery structural characteristics to varying degrees. Additionally, the kurtosis of the coreness distributions
vary considerably, indicating that the tails range from very fat to much thinner. In
other words, while sometimes influence is distributed relatively more evenly across
the network, other times it is highly concentrated in only a small handful of Members.

Figure 10: Year-to-Year Distribution of Influence by Party
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To better illustrate this, the boxplot in Figure 10 more clearly depicts the
variance in individual influence by party and congressional session. In every party
network all Members in the first three quartiles fall below a coreness score of 0.1.
However, the first three quartiles are far more condensed in some party networks
than in others, suggesting a larger, less influential network periphery. Compare, for
instance, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party in the 1998 electoral cycle
(the 105th Congress). Whereas the bottom 75 percent of Republican Members are
tightly concentrated in the lower coreness range, coreness of the bottom 75 percent
of Democratic Members is much more dispersed.
Likewise, the upper whiskers representing the fourth quartile of the party networks are disproportionately longer relative to the other quartiles. This would suggest that the distribution at higher levels of coreness are more sparse. In other words,
the distribution is skewed to the right, because the mean is artificially inflated above
the median by a few, more extreme observations. However, it is also important to
point out that the length of the upper whisker is generally proportional to the distribution of the rest of the party. Not surprisingly, the Republican Party tends to
exhibit stronger core-periphery characteristics than the Democratic Party which is
consistent with the findings of the network-level analysis discussed earlier.
Additionally, on the farthest end of the coreness spectrum, the outliers show
quite a bit of variation in the distribution of the most influential Members in each
party network. The outliers, denoted in Figure 10 as individual points, might best
be described as the core of the core. Comparing the Democratic Party in 1998 to
the Republican Party in 2004, for instance, presents this variation in stark contrast.
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In the Democratic Party in 1998, there are only four MCs—Charlie Rangel, Lois
Capps, David Bonior, and Martin Frost—with coreness scores between 0.15 and 0.35.
However, Dick Gephardt stands out as by far the single most influential Member with
a coreness score of 0.686. For the Republican Party in 2004, the outlier coreness range
is much tighter ranging from 0.185 to 0.305. What is noteworthy about this party
network is that no Members stand out as exceptionally more influential than others.
In fact, the top three most influential Members—Tom Delay, John Boehner, and
Denny Hastert—are all within 0.09 points of each other.

Conclusion
In sum, the purpose of this chapter has been to set the empirical stage for testing the
structural theory of party change. In doing so, I have constructed and descriptively
analyzed the Republican and Democratic Party networks between 1998 and 2018.
I began by looking at the parties at the network level. Specifically, I looked at
trends in party cohesion. The data suggest that while both parties have become
increasingly cohesive over time, the Republicans are generally the more cohesive
party overall. This can be interpreted that Members of each party have grown
increasing cooperative electorally with their copartisans. I then tested whether party
cohesion is correlated with party polarization. A strong positive correlation generally
supports the common narrative in the literature that parties tend to unify as they
grow ideologically more distant and distinct from one another.
However, an analysis of the sub-party level paints a more nuanced picture of
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intra-party electoral relationships. Rather than party Members being a cohesive
group of mutually cooperative actors, it turns out that most electoral support is
driven by a small subset of core Members, which implies an intra-party power dynamic between influencers (the core) and the influenced (the periphery). Moreover,
the changes in core-periphery suggest that Member influence tends to wax and wane.
Although not conclusive, this analysis has provided preliminary empirical support
for the theoretical framework thus far.
In the next chapter, I will take a more in-depth look at party change as a
function of individual behavior. Specifically, I will look at the effects of influence
in the party network on Members’ willingness to shift on policy positions, their
propensity to exit Congress, and the likelihood that they will be challenged in a
primary. If the data ultimately show that influence has an effect on one or more of
these mechanisms of party change, when taken in conjunction with the preliminary
party level evidence offered in this chapter, there will be compelling evidence that
a new direction of party research centered on Member-to-Member relationships is
warranted.
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Chapter 4:
The Mechanisms of Party Change
As we have seen, the literature on American political parties, particularly within
the context of Congress, is rife with studies devoted to the nature of party change.
For some, party change occurs because of incongruence between the parties and the
electorate, usually resulting from tumultuous events or issues (Brady 1988; Burnham
1970; Key 1959; Schattschneider 1948; Sundquist 2011). For others, it is a function of
how parties gradually shift issue positions over time (Abramowitz 1994; Adams 1997;
Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002; Wolbrecht
2002). In the course of studying why parties change, most scholars, whether implicitly
or explicitly, also address the processes of parties change (Fleisher and Bond 2004;
Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Karol 2009; Theriault 2006)—what I refer to as the
mechanisms of party change.
However, studies of these mechanisms have often been conceptually limited. In
fact, many believe that party change is predominantly driven by replacement (Brady
and Lynn 1973; Clausen 1973; Fiorina 1974). In other words, as each Member leaves
Congress, they are replaced by a new Member with a different ideology or set of
policy positions (to varying degrees). But, there are two fundamental problems with
relying on replacement as a mechanism of party change. The first is that replacement
is a broad concept, encompassing any event in which an incumbent is succeeded by a
Member of the same party—i.e. retirement, electoral loss, resignation (for any reason,
including scandal or personal reasons), or even death. While it is clear that any of
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these events in the aggregate can lead to changes in the party, they are arguably
capturing very different ideological party dynamics. For instance, a Member who
opts out of Congress because they have been marginalized by a new-guard in the
party caucus has ideological implications whereas someone who leaves because of a
scandal or for personal reasons does not. Likewise, an incumbent who loses to a
primary challenger could indicate an ideological motive, while a new Member filling
the seat of a recently deceased MC does not. This is not to suggest that these other
types of replacement will not lead to ideological shifts in a party, only that they are
the consequences of other factors not of particular interest here.
The second flaw is that, in treating replacement as the predominant mechanism
of party change, there is an implicit assumption that MCs rarely if ever change
ideological or policy positions. In one of the clearest assertions of this sentiment,
Keith Poole (2007, p.435) once argued that “[M]embers of Congress die in their
ideological boots...once elected to Congress, members adopt an ideological position
and maintain that position throughout their careers—once a liberal or a conservative
or a moderate, always a liberal or a conservative or a moderate.” However, other
scholars, such as Karol (2009), Asher and Weisberg (1978), Theriault (2006, 2008),
and Fleisher and Bond (2004) have recognized that individual level change can and
does affect party position in the aggregate over time.
In Chapter 2, I presented a structural theory of party change. I argued that
change occurs via three primary mechanisms—assimilation, marginalization, and
opportunity—each of which is a function of Member influence in the party caucus. In
Chapter 3, I measured and analyzed the internal structures of the parties in Congress,
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and I argued that the parties exhibit core-periphery structural dynamics, with those
in the core wielding greater influence over those in the periphery. I also demonstrated
that who is in the core and how much influence they have changes across time. In
this chapter, I have two primary objectives. The first is to test whether influence
in the party caucus—as measured by the coreness coefficient 29 derived in Chapter
3—has any effect on assimilation, marginalization, and opportunity.30 The second
is to assess whether each of these mechanisms is more likely to occur under certain
structural conditions of the party network.
This chapter will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will offer a brief
discussion of how the mechanisms of party change have been treated in the literature. This will be followed by a series of sections testing the effects of individual
influence (Level 1) on the three mechanisms of party change. In each of these sections, I will situate the respective mechanism within the context of the theoretical
framework, from which I will propose several hypotheses. First, I will assess whether
less influential Members in Congress are more likely to assimilate to the ideological
positions of their more influential peers. In doing so, I evaluate the effects on two
dimensions: 1) which Members are more likely to change (ideological volatility); and
2) which Members are more likely to affect the change of others in their favor (ideological homophily). Next, I test whether influence is a predictor of marginalization,
as measured by certain instances of Member retirement. And third, I assess whether
influence is a predictor of opportunity, as measured by primary challenges. After
29

Recall, the coreness coefficient measures how central an individual MC is within the overall
party network—the higher the coreness coefficient, the greater the influence.
30
I use the terms influence and coreness interchangeably for stylistic purposes.
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the sections on Level 1 individual effects, I will turn to Level 2 structural effects,
testing whether each of these mechanisms is predicted by the structural dynamics of
the party network.
Ultimately, I find supporting evidence that peripheral Members tend to assimilate to the positions of their more influential counterparts in the core. However, the
data suggest that aggregate party change via assimilation is a glacially slow process,
likely taking years. I also find strong support that core MCs are far less likely to
retire than peripheral Members. However, this effect is conditional on whether the
peripheral Member had recently lost influence. Members who lost a greater amount
of influence to become peripheral in the party had the highest probability of opting
out. I find no evidence at the individual level that coreness has any significant effect
on the probably of facing a primary challenge.
When it comes to Level 2 structural effects, the conclusions are also mixed but
nonetheless instructive. When structural effects are introduced into the assimilation
models, the evidence suggests that while there does appear to be some structural
effects at play, assimilation is not necessarily more likely under an establishment
core. The effect of influence on Member exit appears to not be conditioned by core
structure at all. In other words, anytime a Member loses influence in the party, they
are far more likely to retire. And finally, primary challenges appear to be highly
specific to a factional core.
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Testing the Mechanisms
Scholars have identified two primary mechanisms of party change. The first is conversion, sometimes referred to in the literature as adaptation31 . Adaptation is the
process in which MCs will change their voting behavior to align with others in the
party. The conventional wisdom is that adaptation results in an ideological convergence to the party median (Fleisher and Bond 2004; Theriault 2006, 2008). While the
notion of party median convergence is not necessarily antithetical to the structural
theory of party change presented here, it is conditional. Indeed, it is often the case
that core structures are ideologically distributed in such a way that party median
convergence is the most rational outcome. However, there are times in which the
party median does not reflect the ideological dynamic of a party’s core. Take, for
instance, an ideological distribution in which the core is bimodal (or multimodal)
instead of unimodal. In this case, Members converge to the ideological modal point
closest in proximity.
The second mechanism of party change is replacement, which occurs when an
incumbent leaves office and is replaced by someone from their party. Replacement can
occur for a variety of reasons including retirement, defeat in a primary, resignation, or
death. While certainly any of these events can lead to party change, only retirement
and defeat in a primary have theoretical implications for intra-party dynamics. On
the one hand, retirement can be an indication that a Member no longer fits with the
party (Lee and Goff 2021; Thomsen 2017). On the other, primary challenges may
suggest that a party is divided into ideological factions (Buisseret and Van Weelden
31

See Carsey and Layman (2006)
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2020; Cowburn 2020; Hortala-Vallve and Mueller 2015).
Until relatively recently, many believed that MCs do not change their “ideological boots.” Even when faced with significant shocks to their electoral calculus, such as
redistricting (Poole 2007; Poole and Romer 1993) or seeking a different office (Grofman et al. 1995), Members remained ideologically steadfast. However, some scholars
have since demonstrated that Members do indeed change ideological positions, and
they do it quite routinely. In fact, Roberts and Smith (2003) and Theriault (2006)
find that adaptation can account for more that 50 percent and more than a third,
respectively, of party shifts to the poles. But, that is not to say that party change
via replacement is a theory that has fallen out of fashion. Most scholars who adopt
the adaptation stance acknowledge that party change is simultaneously occurring via
replacement.32
While I agree that adaptation and replacement are occurring in tandem, I argue that the processes are more theoretically nuanced than has been presented in
the literature. For this reason, I use the term assimilation instead of adaptation,
because assimilation implies a degree of external pressure.33 I also draw a conceptual distinction between two different mechanisms that both lead to replacement:
marginalization and opportunity. Thus, in the next three sections, I will discuss the
theoretical underpinnings of assimilation, marginalization, and opportunity, and I
will test the empirical viability of each.
32

See Fleisher and Bond (2004), Karol (2009), Lee and Brady (2020), and Theriault (2006, 2008).
To be sure, core Members are not actively pressuring or coercing the voting behavior of their
peripheral counterparts. Nevertheless, the leverage implicit in influence suggests that changes in
behavior are not entirely self-motivated.
33
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Testing Assimilation
The concept of assimilation implies that some Members of lesser influence are moving toward others with greater influence in order to align with them ideologically.
Thus, assimilation is a two dimensional concept: 1) which Members are changing
ideologically, and 2) which Members are affecting ideological change in their favor. I
measure the first dimension as ideological volatility—the extent to which a Member
changes ideologically from session-to-session. While virtually all MCs shift from one
session to another to some degree, I expect to see greater volatility among the less
influential MCs and greater stability among those with more influence.
Hypothesis 2a: There is a negative relationship between Member influence and ideological volatility.
I measure the second dimension as ideological homophily—the extent to which a
Member induces ideological conformity among their recipient connections. Thus, I
expect more influential Members to induce greater conformity among their connections than those with lesser influence.
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive relationship between Member influence ideological homophily.

Ideological Volatility
To operationalize ideological volatility, I calculate session-to-session differences in
Nokken-Poole ideology scores collected from the NOMINATE dataset. While NOMINATE scores are effective for testing network level trends, they are insufficient for
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testing changes at the individual level. This is because NOMINATE assumes ideological constancy across time—that is, Members do not change ideological positions
over the course of their career (Lewis et al. 2020). Thus, changes that do occur
are captured at the party-level, a combined function of changes in Congressional
party membership and the imputation of new data points. However, Nokken-Poole
assumes that each congressional session is independent and therefore, the actions of
each Member indicate their position in ideological space at that point in time (Lewis
et al. 2020).
Recall, at this stage I am only focused on who is more likely to change. Therefore, for the purposes of testing hypothesis 2a and for ease of interpretation, I transform volatility into absolute values which have an observed range of 0 to 0.565. The
greater the value, the greater an individual’s ideological volatility from one congressional session to another. I also introduce several control variables to account
for competing explanations of volatility. First, I control for age and tenure, since
both have been shown to impact legislative behavior. Curry and Haydon (2018),
for instance, show that an MC’s age affects their support for certain types of issues.
Likewise, Hibbing (1991) finds that length of tenure affects the likelihood of partyline voting. Additionally, status as majority or minority party has been shown to
have an effect on legislative behavior (Aldrich and Rohde 2000a,b; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Therefore, I introduce a dummy variable to control for majority status.34
Finally, since patterns in voting behavior might be affected by the competitiveness
34

It is important to point out that each of these factors can reasonably have an effect on all types
of Member behavior and decisions, as well as the decisions and behavior of others. Because of this,
I include age, length of tenure, and majority status as standard controls in all the models going
forward.
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of one’s district (Gordon and Huber 2007; Kuklinski 1977), I also control for the
percent of incumbent vote share in the previous general election.35
Table 6: Ideological Volatility Ordinary Least Squares Models
Ideological
Volatility

Influence

OLS Robust
Base

OLS Robust
Full

-0.03*
(0.012)

-0.026*
(0.012)

Age

0.001
(0.001)

Tenure

-0.002
(0.002)

Majority

0.015**
(0.02)

District
Competitiveness

-0.006
(0.007)

N
R2

3820
0.001*

3655
0.02**

Standard Errors in Parentheses
† p <0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <.01
35

District competitiveness is coded as the percent of vote share – 1. So, the higher the value, the
more competitive the district.
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To test the volatility hypothesis, I ran an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model with robust standard errors. Table 6 shows that influence is statistically
significant at the p < .05 level. Additionally, the negative coefficient is in the predicted direction. That is, the less influential a Member is, the more likely they are
to change ideologically from session-to-session; the more influential, the more likely
they are to remain ideologically stable. The substantive effect, however, is relatively
weak. A one unit change in influence predicts only a 2.6 percent change in ideology
(more on this shortly).

Ideological Homophily
To operationalize ideological homophily, I first ran analyses of Member Ego Networks
(Ego Nets). An Ego Net is the personal sub-network of any given actor in the primary
network (Borgatti et al. 2018; Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Scott 2017). In the Ego
Net, the specified actor (the Ego) is the central node, and all of their direct recipient
connections are referred to as Alters. For example, if we wanted to look at the
Ego Net for Member A, it would include A as the central node, and A’s recipient
connections. In other words, the Ego Net is an individual actor’s personal sphere of
influence.36 (For a visual illustration and description of an example Ego Net, please
see Appendix C)
A benefit of using Ego Net analysis is that it provides the ability to measure
how actors group together in a network. One such measure is homophily, or the
36

For greater depth on Ego Networks, see Borgatti and Everett (2000), Scott (2017), and Hanneman and Riddle (2005).
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degree to which alters are similar to their Ego node on a particular attribute (in this
case, ideology score). Homophily is measured on a scale of -1 to 1. Higher positive
values indicate greater similarity between an Ego’s ideology score and those of their
Alters on average, whereas negative values indicate greater difference (heterophily).37
Thus, homophily as a function of influence would suggest that the more influential an
Ego is, the more likely that their Alters on average will be ideologically similar. And
since core Members are the most ideologically stable, we can infer that homophily
occurs when Alters move toward core Egos. Thus, party change via assimilation will
tend to favor those with the greatest influence.
In modeling the effect of influence on homophily, I again include age, length
of tenure, and majority status as standard control variables. Although I omit district competitiveness as it would have no theoretically plausible effect on ideological
grouping patterns, I do introduce several demographic variables to control for possible intervening effects. These include variables for gender, race, and region.38
I began by running a standard OLS regression. While the model generally
performed well in the tests of assumptions, one significant concern from a theoretical standpoint was that influence might be an endogenous regressor. Specifically,
the concern is that Members who already associate with ideologically similar groups
might be more likely to contribute to those in their group. Therefore, I tested for
37

Homophily scores closer to 0 suggest that there is no discernible pattern of similarity or
difference—that is, the Ego Net is randomly structured with regard to the attribute of interest.
38
Region is a categorical variable coded according to the regional definitions of the US Census.
I also generated a subregion variable based on the US Census definitions. Subregion included nine
regions instead of four. However, using subregion instead of region as a control had no deleterious
statistical or substantive effect.
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endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test, which introduces predicted
values of the suspected endogenous variable into the original regression model (Mulligan 1996). The results suggested that endogeneity was indeed an issue. However,
it is important to note that, although sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that the
regressor is exogenous, the results were far from definitive. In fact, the DWH test
returned a p value of .032, only slightly less than the .05 threshold.39
To deal with the endogenous regressor, I opted for a Two-stage Least Squares
(2SLS) regression model.40 The idea behind Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) is
to model the predicted values of an instrument variable’s effect on the endogenous
regressor (the first stage) into the original regression (the second stage) (Wooldridge
2015). 2SLS requires an instrument variable that is reasonably well correlated with
the endogenous regressor but not very well correlated with the dependent variable.
In other words, the instrument should have an impact on the dependent variable
only through the endogenous explanatory variable.
To be sure, finding a theoretically effective instrument variable is challenging in
the best of circumstances. However, I opted to use a dummy variable for positions of
leadership in the House as an instrument. The expectation is that those in leadership
positions are far more likely to raise greater sums of money, and thus contribute more
to incumbent reelections. But, it is unclear whether being in a position of leadership
necessarily directly affects the level of homophily among those with whom they are
39

While evidence of endogeneity does require the use of instrument variables, there is a trade off.
Instrument variable models tend to be less efficient than a standard OLS model(Cameron 2010).
Therefore, I have also included the results of the OLS models in Appendix C.
40
To run 2SLS, I use Stata’s ivregress2 command. The benefit of using ivregress2 over the
basic ivregress is that the former automatically includes postestimation tests in the results.
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connected.
To verify the effectiveness of leadership as an instrument, I first ran pairwise
correlations on the instrument variable and the endogenous regressor, and then on
the instrument variable and the dependent variable. With a statistically significant
coefficient of 0.407, the first pairwise correlation suggest that there is a moderate positive correlation between positions of leadership and LPAC contributions. However,
a statistically significant coefficient of just 0.082 suggests a weak positive relationship
between the instrument and ideological homophily. These findings were confirmed
by comparing the Stock-Yogo weak instrument critical values to the Cragg-Donald
Wald F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo values ranged from 16.38 to 5.53, all well below
the F-statistic of 547.277. This suggests that leadership is an extremely strong and
effective instrument variable.41
For comparative purposes, I ran multiple variations of the 2SLS models which
are available in Table 7. I began with a base 2SLS model with controls omitted. I
then run the full model introducing the controls. Next, I reran the two variations,
but this time with robust standard errors. We can see that there is virtually no
decline in substantive effect when controls are introduced. Likewise, although using
robust standard errors weakens the significance slightly, Influence remains statistically significant at the p < .05 level. The coefficient suggests that, holding all other
variables constant, for every unit of increase in influence there is a 0.249 increase in
homophily.
41

For additional reading on instrument strength, see Stock et al. (2002).
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Table 7: Ideological Homophily Two-Stage Least Squares Models
Ideological
Homophily
Influence

2SLS
Base

2SLS
Full

2SLS Robust
Base

2SLS Robust
Full

0.253**
(0.089)

0.249**
(0.088)

0.253*
(0.104)

0.249*
(0.101)

Age

0.001*
(0.000)

0.001*
(0.000)

Tenure

0.002*
(0.001)

0.002*
(0.001)

Majority

0.013†
(0.007)

0.013
(0.008)

Female

0.016*
(0.008)

0.016*
(0.008)

Race

0.017**
(0.005)

0.017**
(0.005)

Region

-0.016**
(0.003)

-0.016**
(0.003)

N
R2

2284
0.073

2281
0.09

Standard Errors in Parentheses
† p <0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <.01
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2284
0.073

2281
0.09

However, while influence has a reasonably strong substantive effect on Member
conformity, recall its effect on volatility was relatively limited. This would suggest
that core Members are in fact driving the ideological direction of the party. Yet,
the movement of peripheral Members is slow and incremental. In other words, while
party change does indeed occur via assimilation, it is process that likely takes many
years to manifest in any meaningful substantive transformation. These result are in
line with the issue evolution framework which argues that party change is process
that takes place over the long term.

Testing Marginalization
Although the reelection rate is very high for congressional incumbents, MCs opt to
vacate their seats on a fairly regular basis. In fact, a report from the Congressional
Research Service shows that during the period under investigation here (1998-2018),
the rate of MCs who left Congress willingly ranged between approximately 8 percent
and nearly 17 percent (Glassman et al. 2021). However, Members opt out for a
variety of reasons. And understanding the motivations of someone who chooses to
leave Congress is challenging. To be sure, there is a distinction between those who
leave mid-session and those who complete their terms. On the one hand, those who
leave before their term is up do so via resignation. Resignations can happen for any
number of reasons, including health problems, personal or family issues, or because
of a scandal. On the other, those who leave after finishing their term are said to
have retired. Retirement can also be for a variety of reasons including coming to
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the natural end of a career, seeking other public office, pursuing a career in the
private sector, becoming exhausted with tough electoral conditions in their district,
not wanting to serve in the minority party, or because of a scandal—a scandal that
is perhaps not serious enough to have resulted in a call for a mid-session resignation,
but that could nevertheless be politically problematic going forward.
But, there are also those who may leave because they have been marginalized
within their party. Marginalization occurs when a Member does not fit with their
party in terms of policy or ideology yet also no longer has the clout to change
the party’s direction. Consequently, they are pushed to the fringes of the party
network. When faced with such a conundrum, the marginalized MC may choose to
exit political life. The dependent variable I use to measure exit is Member retirement.
There may be some instances in which a Member feels marginalized enough to resign.
However, this is likely very rare and would require fairly extreme circumstances.42
In most cases, the marginalized Member would simply ride out the rest of their term
and exit relatively quietly.
Thus, retirement is a binary variable, coded as 1 if the Member retires and 0
if the Member seeks reelection, leaves to run for or serve in another public office,43
42

Although a great example of a Member leaving Congress due to marginalization, John Boehner
actually resigned in 2015. However, Boehner’s situation was unique. First, Boehner was not only
an influential Member in the Republican caucus, he was the Speaker of the House. Thus, his loss
of influence in the party caucus was extraordinary, even relative to the average core individual.
Second, Boehner didn’t just face garden-variety marginalization efforts, he was facing a motion to
vacate the chair—essentially a vote of no confidence. Although impossible to know for sure, it is
quite likely that, if not for the motion to vacate the chair, Boehner would have finished his term
and retired.
43
To qualify as seeking another office, the MC must serve concurrently or run in the next scheduled
election for the office being sought. For example, if an MC retires and then runs in their state’s next
gubernatorial election, they are coded as having left to seek other office. However, if a gubernatorial
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or resigns. Additionally, to rule out the other alternative reasons for retirement
discussed above, I control for a Member’s age, tenure in Congress, their party’s
majority status, the intensity of their district’s competitiveness, and any scandal
that did not result in a resignation.44
However, Members are rarely forthcoming about intra-party conflicts or the political grievances they have with their co-partisans. In fact, it is arguably a political
norm that Members do not air the party’s dirty laundry, even if they are feeling
aggrieved. Therefore, in order to measure marginalization it is necessary to capture
multiple dynamics. First and foremost, marginalization is a direct reflection of Member influence in the party network. Clearly, MCs who are not influential in the party
are going to be the ones who feel marginalized. That is, the less influential an MC
is, the more likely they are to retire.
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative overall effect of a Member’s level of
influence on the probability that they will retire.
But, marginalization also implies that an MC has been pushed to the margins of the
party network—that is, they were recently not on the margins. So, someone who
has been marginalized has lost influence to some degree or another. Therefore, the
effect of Member influence is conditional on how much their influence changes from
session-to-session.
Hypothesis 3b: Peripheral Members who recently lost influence have a
greater probability of retirement than peripheral Members who have had
election passes and then they run for governor, they are coded as retired.
44
The scandal must have occurred in the congressional session in which the retirement is coded.
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little to no change.
Hypothesis 3c: The closer to the core a Member is, the less effect recent
changes in influence will have on the probability of retirement.
To illustrate this, let us consider two hypothetical MCs: the “career backbencher” and the “mover-and-shaker.” If the career backbencher was close to the
margins of the party network last session, it makes little difference if they are at
the margins again this session—because that is where they always are. But, if the
mover-and-shaker one day finds themselves on the margins after being a significant
player in the party caucus, they will be far more likely to opt out of political life.
Conversely, a recent decrease in influence is less likely to impact the probability of
retirement if the Member is still reasonably close to the core of the party after the
loss.
To test Hypothesis 3a, I began by running an instrument variable probit model
because I was again concerned about endogeneity. Instrument variable probit in Stata
automatically tests for endogeneity, returning a Wald χ2 of the null hypothesis that
the variable is exogenous. In this case, the Wald χ2 value of 1.19 was insignificant
(p = 0.275). Therefore I opted for a standard probit regression model. Column
2 in Table 8 shows that when holding all other variables constant, influence has
a statistically significant negative effect on the probability of retirement. This is
consistent with the theory and suggests that as an MC becomes less influential in
the party network, there is a greater probability that they will opt for retirement.
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Table 8: Retirement Probit Models
Retirement
Influence

Base
Probit

Full
Probit

Base Probit
Interaction

Full Probit
Interaction

-2.12**
(0.737)

-3.38**
(0.901)

-1.341†
(0.762)

-2.711**
(0.961)

-6.76**
(0.98)

-5.753**
(1.08)

15.883**
(4.006)

17.687**
(4.68)

Change
in Influence
Influence X Change
Influence
Age

0.02**
(0.004)

0.02**
(0.005)

Tenure

0.054**
(0.009)

0.045**
(0.01)

Majority

0.143†
(0.03)

0.214**
(0.081)

District
Competitiveness

3.491**
(0.426)

3.477**
(0.455)

Scandal

0.091
(0.168)

0.122
(0.173)

N
Pseudo R2

4882
0.006**

4879
0.15**

Standard Errors in Parentheses
† p <0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <.01
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3823
0.03**

3822
0.151**

Figure 11: Marginal Effects of Influence on Retirement

However, to better interpret the substantive impacts of Member influence, I
calculated the marginal effects for the probability of retirement. Figure 11 shows
that there is a clear downward trend. That is, the probability of retirement drops
considerably as a Member’s influence in the party network increases. In fact, the
greatest effects are on Members with coreness coefficients less than 0.3. As a Member’s coreness coefficient drops from 0.3 to 0, the probability of retirement increases
from approximately 1 percent to nearly 6 percent. However, coreness coefficients
above 0.3 have a predicted probability of retirement of less than 1 percent at most.
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Those with the highest influence (coreness coefficients between 0.6 and 0.7) have
almost a 0 probability of retiring.
For the next two hypotheses, I generated a variable for changes in Member influence. Change in influence is measured as the session-to-session differences in coreness
coefficients. A negative value means the Member has lost influence in the party caucus relative to the previous session, while a positive value indicates a Member has
gained influence. I then reran the original probit model but introduced change in influence as an interaction effect on influence. Turning attention to Table 8 once again,
we can see that influence as an independent effect remains statistically significant
(p < 0.01). Likewise, although there is a slight decline in the coefficient from -3.38
to -2.71, influence remains substantively significant and in the predicted direction,
suggesting that there is still an overall negative relationship between influence and
the probability of retirement. Similarly, session-to-session changes in influence is
statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level and independently has a strong negative
effect on the probability of retirement. This would suggest that a loss of influence
generally increases the probability that a Member will opt to retire.
Perhaps most notable, however, is the interactive effect between level of influence and changes in influence. The coefficient of the interaction term is again
highly statistically significant (p < 0.01), and suggests that changes in influence
conditionally impacts the relationship between Member influence and the probability of retirement. However, interpreting the coefficients directly can be misleading.
Therefore, to better show the effects, I ran predictive margins. I then plotted how
session-to-session changes in influence affects the probability of retirement for Mem86

bers at various levels of coreness. Figure 12 clearly illustrates this conditional effect.

Figure 12: Conditional Effects of Influence on Retirement

For example, an MC who goes from a coreness coefficient of 0.5 to 0 (a change
in influence of -0.5) has a probability of retirement greater than 90 percent. The
probability of retirement for a Member who goes from 0.6 to 0.1 (the same change of
-.5) drops to approximately 70 percent, whereas the probability of retirement for a
Member who changes -.5 to a coreness coefficient of 0.2 is only about 30 percent. It
is also worth noting that for every coreness level, the probability of retirement drops
below 10 percent when there is either no change or an increase in influence from the
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previous session. This provides incredibly strong support for both Hypothesis 3b
and Hypothesis 3c.
Perhaps the strongest evidence in support of hypothesis 3c, however, can be
seen in the conditional effects of changing influence at the highest levels of coreness.
Please note the effects for coreness levels 0.3 and 0.4 in Figure 12. While significant
declines in influence only reach a predicted probability of just over 10 percent for
Members at an 0.3 coreness level, for those at 0.4, there is virtually no swing large
enough to increase the probability of retirement. Once again, the results strongly
support the idea that Member influence is a predictor of marginalization.

Testing Opportunity
There has been quite a bit of talk in recent years about incumbents “getting primaried” for ideological reasons. This is often accompanied by the notion that fears
of a primary challenge may have a tangible impact on an MC’s behavior (Crisp et al.
2004; Jewitt and Treul 2019; Kanthak and Crisp 2005). To be sure, as we saw in the
introductory chapter, there have certainly been a number of high-profile primaries
that have resulted in the ouster of a prominent incumbent, particularly in the last
two decades.
At this point, however, the research on primary challenges is quite mixed. There
are some such as Jewitt and Treul (2019) who argue that the frequency and ideological nature of primary challenges have steadily increased. Others such as Boatright
(2013) find little evidence that credible primary challenges are more frequent today
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than they were in the late 20th century, or that challengers necessarily target incumbents strictly for ideological reasons. However, if there is evidence that primaries are
in some way structurally systematic—that is, weaker peripheral Members get primaried more frequently than stronger core Members—that could have implications
for the way a party changes. In other words, party change via primary challenges
would tend to favor those in the core, just as it does with retirement and assimilation.
There is some research to suggest that primary challenges are driven more by
an incumbent’s weakness. Kenney (1988), for instance, points out that primary
challenges are more common when an incumbent is in the midst of a scandal or
has limited legislative experience. Therefore, it stands to reason that if personal
or professional weaknesses increase the likelihood of a primary challenge, then an
incumbent who has relational weakness in the party caucus might also be more susceptible to being primaried. In other words, because peripheral Members inherently
lack influence and resources, they are low hanging fruit in the electoral sense.45
Hypothesis 4a: The more influential an MC is in the party caucus, the
less likely they are to face a primary challenge.
However, there is also evidence to suggest that district competitiveness impacts
the probability that an incumbent will face a primary challenge. Although it was
initially believed that primaries had virtually no effect on general election results
(Hacker 1965), most now maintain that primaries do have a deleterious effects on
45

It is also worth adding that studies have shown that challengers are typically unable to raise
much in the way of campaign funds from PACs (Magleby et al. 2018). This makes challenging
peripheral Members more strategically sound.
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performance in a general election (Born 1981; Kenney and Rice 1984, 1987; Piereson
and Smith 1975). The implication is that challengers, being partisans themselves,
should emerge only in safer districts to prevent damaging incumbents who may face
a tough fight in the general election (Geer 1988; Grofman 1995; Norrander 1989).
Hypothesis 4b: The probability of a primary challenge increases as the
competitiveness of a district decreases.
The dependent variable is a binary outcome—whether or not an incumbent faces
a primary challenge—coded 1 in the event of a primary challenge and 0 otherwise.
Data on primary challenges comes from the extensive work on congressional primaries
by Robert Boatright (2013). While Boatright (2013) defines a credible primary
challenge as one in which the challenger gets at least 25 percent of the vote, the
intention here is not to distinguish between a primary that is credible and one that
is not. Rather, the goal is to measure whether any challenger identifies and seizes an
opportunity to unseat an incumbent.
As in previous models, I use influence as the primary independent variable. I
also include district competitiveness as an independent variable. In addition to the
standard controls of previous models, I also control for scandal (Kenney 1988), as
well as the type of primary that each state and party uses.46

46

In some states, the two parties use different primary types. In Utah for example, Republicans
use closed primary rules in which the voter must be a registered Republican to participate. But,
the Democrats in Utah use semi-closed primary rules in which the voter must be either a registered
Democrat or unaffiliated. Primary rules data are collected from Ballotpedia (2021), an organization
that aggregates data and information on American elections.
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Table 9: Primary Challenges Probit Models
Base
Probit

Full
Probit

Influence

0.61†
(0.331)

0.476
(0.334)

District
Competitiveness

-0.778**
(0.155)

-0.774**
(0.157)

Primary

Age

-0.01**
(0.002)

Tenure

0.015**
(0.005)

Majority

-0.064†
(0.039)

Scandal

-0.296**
(0.09)

Primary
Type

0.036†
(0.019)

N
Pseudo R2

4882
0.004**

Standard Errors in Parentheses
† p <0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <.01

91

4879
0.01**

Once again, I ran an instrument variable probit model to test for endogeneity. The Wald χ2 returned a statistically insignificant (p = 0.504) value of 0.45.
Therefore, to test the two hypotheses on primary challenges, I ran a standard probit
model, first with the two variables of interest, and then a full model with all controls. In both models, the coefficient for Member influence was neither statistically
significant nor in the predicted direction. However, district competitiveness shows a
statistically significant (p < .01) negative relationship, suggesting that incumbents
in safer districts are indeed more likely to face a primary challenge than those in
more competitive districts.

Structural Effects
The structural theory of party change has two levels of effects, one nested within the
other. Thus far in this chapter, I have operationalized and tested Level 1, individual
effects. I will now turn attention to Level 2, structural effects. Specifically, are the
mechanisms of party change more likely to occur when certain structural conditions
are present in a party network?
Before moving into the analysis, however, it is first important to offer a brief
recap of the theory, as it relates to party structural effects. I have argued that certain
structural conditions in a party network make assimilation, marginalization, and
opportunity more likely. There are two structural conditions that must be taken into
account. The first is whether the structure itself is relatively stable or unstable. A
stable structure means that core Members tend to stay core, and peripheral Members
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tend to stay peripheral from session-to-session. The second condition is the relative
ideological homogeneity of the core.
I argue that assimilation is more likely to occur under an establishment core,
with a single ideologically group that has dominated across multiple sessions (ideologically homogeneous and stable). This is because, under these conditions, contentious
or divisive internal power struggles are limited, and the position of the party is
clear and consistent to the rank-and-file. Thus, peripheral Members generally fall
in line with the establishment core Members. Marginalization is more likely under
a new-guard core, in which a single dominant group has recently replaced another
(ideologically homogeneous and unstable). In this case, the party has begun shifting in a new direction, and some MCs who were once influential in the old-guard
are pushed to the periphery and decide to exit. Finally, opportunity is more likely
under a factional core, with two or more ideological groups vying for dominance
(ideologically heterogeneous).
Hypothesis 5a: Assimilation is more likely to occur under establishment
core conditions.
Hypothesis 5b: Marginalization is more likely to occur under newguard core conditions.
Hypothesis 5c: Opportunity is more likely to occur under factional core
conditions.
To capture structural stability, I measured session-to-session differences in the
core-periphery coefficient—the network-level measure of whether each party caucus
93

conforms to an ideal core-periphery structure. I then calculated the overall mean for
each party. If session-to-session changes are below the mean for each respective party
caucus, the structure is considered stable. If it is above the mean it is considered
unstable. I then calculate the ideological distribution for the Members who are in
the 10th percentile of influence, and this time take the mean of ideological variance.
If the variance is below the overall mean for the corresponding party’s core, the core
is considered homogeneous—if it is above the mean, it is considered heterogeneous.
Based on these criteria, I create three dummy variables, one for each type of party
structure. If the party caucus for a particular session meets the criteria of a given
structure type, it is coded as 1. If it does not, it is coded as 0.
I then ran the models from the previous sections in this chapter to account for
structural level effects. Unfortunately, the 2SLS model does not have the statistical
capability to run multilevel analyses. Therefore, I ran the 2SLS model by clustering
the standard error by party caucus.47 Although this approach does not provide a
Level 2 coefficient, the effects can be inferred via changes in the Level 1 coefficients.
The other models are estimated using a multilevel modeling (MLM) approach. In
each MLM, I allow the slopes to vary to capture the structural effects on the respective Level 1 relationships. In each model, structural effects are designated as
factor variables. The reference category for each structural type is failure to meet
the defining criteria for the respective core structure.
47

Instrument variable regression (in this case 2SLS) does not allow a vce(cluster) option in
Stata. In order to circumnavigate this, I used xtset to set caucus as the panel (I used a withinpanel observation identifier as the “time” variable). I then estimated the model using xtivreg and
clustered by caucus.
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Table 10: Structural Effects Models
Structural
Effects

Volatility
(MLM)

Level 2
Effects

0.008
(0.007)

Influence

-0.029†
(0.014)

Homophily
(Cluster)

0.27†
(0.156)

Retirement
(MLM)

Primary
(MLM)

-0.019
(0.142)

0.838*
(0.392)

-3.011**
(1.056)

1.07**
(0.41)

+/-Coreness

-6.363**
(1.42)

Influence X
+/-Coreness

14.991*
(6.658)

Age

-0.000
(0.000)

0.000†
(0.000)

0.021**
(0.005)

-0.002
(0.002)

Tenure

-0.000
(0.000)

0.003**
(0.000)

0.049**
(0.01)

0.004
(0.006)

Majority

0.016**
(0.005)

-0.006
(0.021)

0.227†
(0.131)

-0.325
(0.392)

3.54**
(0.479)

-0.684**
(0.175)

0.14
(0.176)

-0.196†
(0.11)

3656
158.64**

4647
28.21**

Female

0.13*
(0.005)

Race

0.015**
(0.005)

Region

-0.016**
(0.003)

District
Competitiveness

-0.016*
(0.007)

Scandal
N
χ2

3655
17.44**

2287
96.02**

Standard Errors in Parentheses
† p <0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <.01
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The results from each model can be seen in Table 10. The first column shows
the results from the Volatility model with Level 2 structural effects. First, note
that the coefficient for Level 2 structural effects in the MLM volatility model is not
statistically significant. Additionally, Influence has lost its statistical significance,
going from the p < .05 level to the p < .1 level. It is worth pointing out, however,
that the coefficient is still in the predicted direction and is substantively consistent
with the results from Table 6. Likewise, Influence in the Homophily model has
maintained its substantive effect and is still in the predicted positive direction. Once
again though, the coefficient has gone from statistically significant (p < .05) to
insignificant (p < .1). These results would likely suggest that while assimilation may
in fact be affected by some type of structural conditions, the theorized effects are not
supported. I suspect that the full effect is not being captured by the conditions of the
establishment core alone. This is most likely because those who are not marginalized
under a new-guard core will also choose to assimilate. Thus, assimilation may be
more likely under both establishment and new-guard cores.
The third column in Table 10 shows the structural effects on marginalization. In
this instance, the main independent variables and the interactive effect are all highly
statistically significant at the p < .01 level. Additionally, the coefficients remain
consistent with predictions, and the substantive effects are robust to Level 2 effects.
However, the structural dynamics do not have a statistically significant impact on
occurrences of marginalization. This would suggest that Members who lose influence
in the party are likely to exit, regardless of the party structure.
Finally, column 4 shows the results of the structural effects on opportunity.
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Recall that the effects of Influence on the probability of a primary challenge were
not statistically significant in the Level 1 model. But, after introducing Level 2
structural effects, the coefficient for Influence becomes highly statistically significant
(p < .01). Moreover, the substantive effect has more than doubled from 0.487 to
1.07. The Level 2 structural effects are also statistically significant at the p < .05
level. The positive Level 2 coefficient would suggest that primary challenges as a
function of influence are generally more likely under factional conditions. To better

Figure 13: Predicted Probability of Primary by Core Structure

interpret the results, however, I ran marginal effects of influence on the predicted
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probability of a primary challenge by core structure. Figure 13 shows that there
is an overall positive relationship between Member influence and the probability of
facing a primary challenger. However, in accordance with the theory, the effect is
consistently stronger under factional core conditions.
Before concluding, it is worth offering a brief discussion on the direction of the
Influence coefficient in the primary challenge models. Recall, I hypothesized (4a)
that peripheral Members would be more likely to face primary challenges because
they are the weakest and offer the path of least resistance to potential challengers.
That hypothesis was informed in part by work of those like Kenney (1988) who
argued that primary challengers are more likely to target weak incumbents. While
that may have been true when Kenney was writing, the findings here suggest that is
no longer the case. In fact, quite the opposite, it appears that primary challengers
target incumbents who are closer to the core.
Why might this be? Let us assume hypothetically that a party’s core is divided
into two factions: Faction A and Faction B, each of which wants to push the party
in its own direction. While it may be easier for Faction A to take out one of Faction
B’s periphery Members, it does little to strengthen Faction A’s position in the party.
But, if Faction A targets one of Faction B’s most influential Members, they remove
a player that has the potential to move the party in another direction. Finally, if
Faction A takes out enough opposing core Members and becomes dominant, Faction
B’s periphery MCs will either assimilate or exit. Thus, it is strategically the most
optimal course of action to target those opposing faction Members who are closest
to the core of the party.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to empirically test multiple implications of
the structural theory of party change. In doing so, I have assessed the effects of
individual Member influence on three mechanisms of party change. I find supporting
evidence that the least influential MCs exhibit the greatest ideological change, and
the most influential are driving that change. Taken together, this suggests that
peripheral Members tend to assimilate to the ideological positions of those Members
with greater influence in the party network. I also find evidence to suggest that
peripheral Members have an overall greater probability of retiring, although this
effect is magnified if the peripheral Member had recently lost influence in the party.
However, while primary challenges appear to be more likely in safer districts, as
predicted, I find no support for the claim that Member influence generally predicts
the emergence of a challenger.
I also tested whether structural conditions of the party caucus have any bearing
on individual Member effects. It turns out that the effect of influence on assimilation
loses significance when accounting for network stability and core homogeneity. This
would suggest that there may be some structural effects but not as predicted. The
effects of influence on marginalization remain robust when introducing structural
effects into the model, but the structural effects are not themselves significant. This
would indicate that marginalization is likely to occur under any structural condition.
And finally, the emergence of primary challenges appears to be highly specific to
parties with ideologically diverse cores. In other words, primary challenges increase
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when parties are factionalized.
In the next and final chapter, I will provide a recap of the theoretical framework
and empirical results presented throughout this work. This will included a discussion
on how the findings here advance the current research on political party change,
particularly within the context of Congress. Based on this discussion, I will offer
some suggestions regarding the future direction of research on political parties, and
highlight areas in particular that require additional attention.
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Chapter 5:
Conclusion
As we have seen, party change is a phenomenon that has captured the attention of
scholars for decades. Yet, there has been little agreement on the causes of party
change, nor on the primary mechanisms through which these changes occurs. Earlier
in this dissertation, I briefly presented an analogy that parties are like living organisms, always changing at the cellular level. To expand on that analogy, Members of
Congress are the cellular units that make up the structure of the party caucus. And
just like cells, MCs are always mutating or being replaced. These minor changes at
the individual level have impacts on the way parties evolve and develop. But, these
processes do not occur in a vacuum; they are affected by the connections Members
share with others.
Thus, the purpose of this dissertation has been to present a structural theory
of party change that accounts not only for individual Member behavior, but also for
how that behavior is conditioned and constrained by the relationships with others, as
well as the overall party structure. In Chapter 2, I focused on developing the theory.
I started by arguing that political parties in Congress can best be conceptualized
as complex networks of relationships that exist between the Members of a respective caucus. Based on these relationships, some Members have greater influence in
the party network than others. Those with greater influence are considered to be
the “core” of the party, while those with less are considered to be the “periphery.”
However, party structures routinely cycle through periods of consolidation and de-
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consolidation. During periods of deconsolidation, many will strive to expand their
own influence in the party and emerge (or reemerge) as part of the core. The party
will then consolidate around a new core.
I identify three core types that can develop. An establishment core is one in
which a single ideological group is dominant, and has maintained its dominance across
multiple Congressional sessions. A new-guard core is also dominated by a single
ideological group but has recently replaced another group with core representation.
And a factional core is one in which multiple ideological groups are represented in
the core simultaneously—although they need not necessarily be equal in strength,
no group dominates the others.
There are also three processes, or mechanisms, through which parties undergo
change. Assimilation refers to a situation in which a Member aligns themselves to
the ideological position of another, more influential Member. Marginalization occurs
when a Member of a once dominant ideological group is pushed to the periphery by
a new-guard and decides to exit professional politics. Marginalization tends to have
the greatest impact on those who were once influential in the party themselves—the
leaders of the previous “establishment.” Finally, opportunity exists when a party’s
core is ideologically divided. Thus, some may perceive the divisions as an opening
to challenge a Member of an opposing ideological group.
I argue that each of these mechanisms is more likely to occur under a specific
core type. First, assimilation is more likely to occur under an establishment core.
One reason is that peripheral MCs will want to align themselves with a more in-
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fluential Member. However, because the establishment core is dominated by one
group, relationships may not be based on ideological considerations. In other words,
peripheral MCs may form relationships with core Members, even if they do not see
eye to eye. Put simply, the dominant group is the only game in town. Likewise,
core Members may help those in the periphery they disagree with in order to build
goodwill and political capital. However, if the dominant group has recently replaced
another group in the core, some in the old group—particularly the leaders—may feel
disaffected. Thus, marginalization is more likely to occur under a new-guard core.
Lastly, competing ideological wings in the core may prompt a potential candidate to
challenge an incumbent of a different faction. Therefore, opportunity is more likely
under a factional core structure.
I approached testing of the theory in three stages. The first stage was to establish empirical support for some preliminary assumptions. Thus, in Chapter 3
I construct party networks based on Member-to-Member Leadership PAC contributions. In total, I constructed 22 party networks—one for each party in every
Congressional session between 1998 and 2018. I then analyzed each network at the
party level, the sub-party level, and the individual level. The party level analyses
appear to support the conventional wisdom that parties become more unified with
increasing polarization. However, sub-party and individual analyses suggest that
intra-party dynamics are more nuanced. While sometimes parties are universally cooperative, other times party connections are driven by only small group of Members.
I also found support for the argument that party structures fluctuate between highly
centralized and much more decentralized.
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I approached the second and third empirical stages in Chapter 4. The second
stage tested whether individual influence has an effect on the three mechanisms of
the party change, and the third stage tested whether those effects are a function
of core structure. Ultimately, the results are mixed. I find supporting evidence
that assimilation is a function of individual influence. In other words, Members
who are connected to others with greater influence in the party network are more
likely to conform to their ideological position. However, although there does seem
to be a structural effect present, assimilation does not appear to be specific to an
establishment core structure. I also find strong support that Members who have lost
influence to become peripheral have the highest probability of retiring. Nevertheless,
this effect is not conditional on core structure type. That is, anytime a Member
goes from being core to peripheral, there is high probability they will exit. Finally,
influence does not appear to be a significant factor in predicting a primary challenge
generally. However, primary challenges are far more likely to occur under a factional
core structure. Table 11 below provides a summary list of hypotheses and their
corresponding conclusions.

Table 11: List of Hypotheses and Conclusions
Hypotheses

Supported

Hypothesis 1: As the parties grow increasingly polarized,
there will be a corresponding increase in party-level cohesion.

Yes

Hypothesis 2a: There is a negative relationship between
Member influence and ideological volatility.

Yes
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Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive relationship between
Member influence and ideological homophily.

Yes

Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative overall effect of a
Member’s level of influence on the probability that they
will retire.

Yes

Hypothesis 3b: Peripheral Members who recently lost
influence have a greater probability of retirement than peripheral Members who have had little to no change.

Yes

Hypothesis 3c: The closer to the core a Member is, the
less effect recent changes in influence will have on the probability of retirement.

Yes

Hypothesis 4a: The more influential an MC is in the
party caucus, the less likely they are to face a primary challenge.

No

Hypothesis 4b: The probability of a primary challenge
increases as the competitiveness of a district increases.

Yes

Hypothesis 5a: Assimilation is more likely to occur under
establishment core conditions.

No

Hypothesis 5b: Marginalization is more likely to occur
under new-guard core conditions.

No

Hypothesis 5c: Opportunity is more likely to occur under
factional core conditions.

Yes

This dissertation fills a number of gaps existing in the literature. Up until now,
most scholars have treated party change as a function of either external pressures,
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such as changing electorates (Brady 1988; Burnham 1970; Key 1955; Schattschneider 1948; Sundquist 2011) or policy demanding groups (Bawn et al. 2012; Karol
2009; Masket 2011), or the aggregate effects individual Member behavior (Carmines
and Stimson 1989; Lee and Brady 2020). The structural theory of party change
introduced here does not discount the possibility that Members sometimes behave
as extensions of external pressures. Nor does it refute the importance of individual
Member preferences. Instead the theory suggests that Member behavior—whether
driven by external pressures or personal motives—is conditioned and constrained by
the relationships they share with their colleagues.
Additionally, I reconceptualize the mechanisms through which parties undergo
change. In the past, scholars have argued that party change happens when either
Members shift positions or are replaced by someone else. Not only are these overly
broad concepts, they generally lack an underlying theoretical catalyst. Therefore, I
have introduced a set of mechanisms that are all driven by intra-party Member relationships, and the way those relationships manifest in different network structures.
I also depart from the idea that one type of mechanism is the dominant driver of
party change. Instead, I contend that each of these mechanisms has the potential to
affect party change, but is contingent upon the structure of the network at a given
point in time.
Finally, I offer a more generalizable framework for understanding the effect of
power and influence on Member behavior. While many scholars have viewed power
dynamics in Congress as existing primarily between party leadership and the rankand-file (Aldrich and Rohde 2000b; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Rohde 2010), I argue
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that the sources of power and influence are everywhere. Political parties are networks
based on social and political relationships. And in virtually every relationship there
is the potential for one side to wield influence over the other. Therefore, in order
to understand Member behavior, we have to expand our view beyond conventional
understandings of power relationships.
With this in mind, I sincerely hope that this work will inspire new directions in
research, both methodologically and theoretically. Regarding methodology, I would
encourage the continued use of Social Network Analysis in political research. Human relationships are incredibly complex and ubiquitous, yet they are all too often
disregarded by political scientists. Understanding the ways in which political actors
interact with one another, and the social structures they form can potentially shed
new light on old questions and highlight novel research agendas.
In terms of theory, I would encourage researchers to apply the framework introduced here but with alternative measures of influence. Although Leadership PAC
contributions are an ideal measure of influence, other possible measures might include endorsements or committee relationships. Future research might also combine
measures. For instance, the researcher might use Member popularity as the measure
of influence, but measure connections based on shared relationships, such as committee or caucus memberships. Another area of research worthy of pursuit would be
to track the ability of some groups to mobilize peripheral supporters based on their
core representation. The findings could have significant implications for the ability
of outside policy demanders to achieve their goals. I would also urge additional research on the effect of core structures on the likelihood of the mechanisms of party
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change. Finally, I would encourage the application of this theory to a comparative
context. For instance, might we understand party change as a function of relationships and individual influence in other democracies? Alternatively, can the theory
be generalized to party change across states? I suspect that the main obstacle to
broad applicability will be institutional variation—i.e. multiparty districts or use of
party lists in other democracies, or differences in laws across the American states.
Nevertheless, I suspect that with some minor theoretical and conceptual modifications, the structural theory of party change can have broad utility across a variety
of democratic contexts.

108

Appendix A:
Glossary of Terms
Alter all nodes that are connected to the ego in an ego network.
Asymmetric Network See Directed Network
Attribute a trait or characteristic that all nodes in a network share.
Cohesion the extent to which a network as a whole is connected.
Compactness a measure of cohesion, calculated as density as well as geodesic distance.
Continuous model a node-level measure that estimates the “coreness” of each
individual in a network.
Core-periphery network a network structure characterized by a hierarchy of importance or influence.
Coreness coefficient a coefficient produced by the continuous model for how central each individual node is in the overall party network; the coreness coefficient is
measured on a scale of 0-1 with 1 representing perfect centrality, or the highest level
influence in the network.
Density a measure of cohesion, calculated as the proportion of possible edges that
are realized in a network.
Directed (asymmetric) network a network in which the initiation of a relationship takes on meaning. (i.e. Tom donates to Sally)
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Discrete model a network-level measure that estimates how well a network approximates a perfect core-periphery structure.
Edges relationships that tie actors in a network together. (i.e. a financial transaction
is an edge)
Ego The primary node of focus in an ego network.
Ego Network (Ego Net) a personal network in which the primary node of focus
is the ego.
Fitness coefficient a coefficient produced by the discrete model for how well a
network approximates a core-periphery structure; the fitness coefficient is measured
on a scale of 0-1 with 1 representing a perfect core-periphery structure.
Geodesic distance the shortest path between any given pair of nodes.
Homophily in an ego network, the extent to which alters are similar to their ego
along an identified attribute.
Isolates nodes that are fully disconnected from all other nodes.
Network a collection of individual actors that share one or many social or institutional attributes.
Nodes or vertices individual actors within a network. (i.e. Tom and Sally are
both nodes)
Symmetric Network See Undirected Network
Undirected (symmetric) network a network in which all connections between
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actors count as relationships, regardless of who initiates the relationship. (i.e. Tom
and Sally have a financial relationship)
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Appendix B:
Hierarchical Clustering Dendrogram
The hierarchical clustering dendrogram depicted in Figure 14 below presents
a visualization of sub-party grouping in the Democratic Party during the 105th
Congress, and is representative of all party caucus networks included in this study.
The dendrogram is a tree diagram in which progressive branching represents subparty communities. However, as Figure 14 clearly shows, these sub-party communities are not discrete. In fact, the first order of grouping shows four communities, all
of which are overlapping. By the second and third orders of grouping, the communities are not only overlapping, they are also beginning to nest within higher order
communities. And by the fourth order, communities are virtually indistinguishable.
This extensive community overlapping and nesting is quite likely why the community
detection algorithms produced inconsistent findings.
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Figure 14: Hierarchical Clustering Dendrogram of the Democratic Party (2018)
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Appendix C:
Ego Networks and OLS Homophily Model
In order to illustrate this concept, let’s say that Members A through F are
in a network together. Member A contributes to B, C, and D. Member D, in turn,
contributes to E and F. Member A’s Ego Net would include A as the Ego (the central
node) and B, C, and D as the Alters. Member D’s Ego Net would include D as the
Ego, and E and F as the Alters.

Figure 15: Full Network

Figure 16: Member A’s Ego Net

Figure 17: Member D’s Ego Net
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Table 12: Ordinary Least Squares Models
Ideological
Homophily

OLS
Base

OLS
Full

OLS
Robust

0.172**
(0.039)

0.149**
(0.039)

0.149**
(0.044)

Age

0.000
(0.000)

0.000†
(0.000)

Tenure

0.002**
(0.000)

0.002**
(0.000)

Majority

-0.011†
(0.006)

-0.011†
(0.006)

Female

0.023**
(0.008)

0.023**
(.008)

Race

0.024**
(0.004)

0.024**
(.005)

Region

-0.018**
(0.002)

-0.018**
(0.003)

2287
0.053**

2287
0.053**

Influence

N
R2

2291
0.008**
Standard Errors in Parentheses
† p <0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <.01
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